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COMMENT
RENO V. CONDON: THE SUPREME COURT TAKES A
RIGHT TURN IN ITS TENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE BY UPHOLDING THE




The Supreme Court rendered a unanimous decision in Reno v.
Condon' on January 12, 2000. Reversing the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Condon v. Reno,2 the Supreme Court held that the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act 3 ("DPPA") was a constitutional exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers and did not violate the principles of
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment.4
The DPPA provides that state departments of motor vehicles
("DMVs"), and their officers, employees, and contractors "shall not
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. This Comment is
dedicated to my parents, Richard W. and Marie Cosgrove for everything, my Aunt
Marion who made attending law school possible, and Aunt Brenda, Aunt Judy. Aunt
Gail, Uncle Paul, Uncle Tom, Michael, Sean, Karen, and Terry for all their guidance
and support. I also wish to thank Professor Charles M. Whelan, S.J., for his assistance
throughout the writing and editorial process.
1. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). This decision settled a circuit split over the
constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"). The Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits had held that the DPPA was unconstitutional because it violated
the limitations that the Tenth Amendment imposes on Congress's exercise of its
Commerce Clause powers. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1284-85, 1288 (1ith Cir.
1999), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 460-63 (4th Cir.
1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). The Seventh and Tenth Circuits had held that the
DPPA was constitutional because it was a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause
powers and did not violate the Tenth Amendment. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000,
1001-02 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000); Oklahoma er ret.
Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998),
cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000).
2. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
3. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 668. For a more detailed explanation of the Court's
holding, see infra Part IV.
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entity personal information about any individual obtained by the
department [of motor vehicles] in connection with a motor vehicle
record."5  This prohibition is subject to numerous mandatory and
discretionary exceptions.6 Although the DPPA principally regulates
the commercial activity of DMVs, the DPPA also regulates the
circumstances in which parties who have obtained personal
information from DMVs may redisclose such information to third
parties.7 Because the DPPA does not apply to states and private
parties in the same way, many commentators and courts concluded
that the DPPA was not a law of general applicability.8 Laws of
general applicability apply equally to private entities and the states.
To comply with the DPPA, some DMVs were forced to change, at a
substantial financial cost, the way they sold and disseminated drivers'
personal information.' States that fail to conform to the DPPA's
requirements by engaging in a pattern of substantial non-compliance
are penalized." Because the DPPA has the practical effect of
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994).
6. See id. § 2721(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
7. See id. § 2721(c) (providing that "[ain authorized recipient of personal
information... may resell or redisclose the information only for" certain permitted
uses).
8. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that
"[t]he DPPA is not a law of general applicability"), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000);
Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the DPPA "for all
intents and purposes" applies solely to states and, therefore, is not generally
applicable), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Thomas H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder,
Challenging the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing
a Jurisprudence of Process-Oriented Federalism under the Tenth Amendment, 53 U.
Miami L. Rev. 71, 155 (1998) (describing the DPPA as not generally applicable
because it "does not 'apply in the same way' to States... and to private activity"); see
also Robert C. Lind & Natalie B. Eckart, The Constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act, 17 Comm. Law. 18, 19-20 (1999) (noting that most courts determined
that the DPPA is not generally applicable). But see Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000,
1005-06 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that even though the DPPA primarily effects the
states, the sale and dissemination of personal information by private parties is
regulated in other federal statutes), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000); Stephen 0.
Hartzell-Jordan, Note, Condon v. Reno and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. Was
Garcia a Bump in the Road to States' Rights?, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 217, 248 (1999)
(discussing how, facially, the DPPA applies solely to States; but "on a second level,
the statute does apply equally to private and public entities").
9. Although most states had to change the way they sold and disseminated
drivers' personal information, eight states already had more restrictive laws in place
before Congress enacted the DPPA and, therefore, did not have to make any
changes. See Angela R. Karras, Note, The Constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act: A Fork in the Information Access Road, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 125, 133
(1999): see also Oliver J. Kim, Note, The Driver's Privacy Protection Act On the Fast
Track to National Harmony or Commercial Chaos?, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 223, 243 (1999)
(noting that a few states, such as Hawaii, Arkansas, and Alaska, had already enacted
privacy legislation that was stricter than the DPPA, but that most States had little or
no privacy protection legislation in place at the time the DPPA was enacted).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b) (1994); Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1283 (noting that the DPPA
penalizes states that do not comply with the DPPA); Condon, 155 F.3d at 457
(recognizing that through the imposition of fines on state DMVs that are found to
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regulating DMVs in a manner that forces them to change the way they
operate in an area traditionally regulated by the states, the DPPA
implicates the constitutional principles of federalism embodied in the
Tenth Amendment.
In general, principles of federalism govern what the federal
government can require the states to do." These principles are
essential to the tripartite governmental structure of the United
States12 because they ensure a governmental system of dual
sovereignty in which the states remain viable political entities, thereby
protecting the people from a potentially tyrannous federal
government.13  The principles of federalism impose restrictions on
Congress's exercise of its enumerated powers. 4 For example, the
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment impose
substantive limitations on Commerce Clause legislation that upsets
have a practice or policy of substantial noncompliance, the DPPA will cause the states
to incur costs and expend effort to comply with the statute); see also Odom & Feder,
supra note 8, at 87-88 (stating that in order for the states to avoid the imposition of
severe penalties for substantial noncompliance with the DPPA, they must make
changes in the state law and its administration).
11. See Dennis M. Cariello, Note, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting
for the Values of Federalism, 26 Fordham Urb. L. 1493, 1550 (1999) (noting that
"[miuch of federalism jurisprudence deals with infringements on 'state's rights' by the
national government"). But see United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 783-85, 802 (1995) (holding that an Arkansas Constitutional provision preventing
individuals who had previously served in Congress for a specified number of terms
from appearing on the ballot was unconstitutional because the power to add
Congressional qualifications was not reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment); id. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("That the States may not invade
the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable.., as the corollary proposition
that the Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power
when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States.").
12. The Framers created a tripartite governmental structure by splitting the atom
of sovereignty between the federal government, the state governments, and the
people. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2287-88 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Framers reduced the probability that one group could implement its own political
agenda by further diffusing sovereignty through the division of the federal powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. "and institutionalizing
methods that allow each branch to check the others." Martin H. Redish, The
Constitution as Political Structure 4 (1995).
13. See Redish, supra note 12, at 4 ("[I1n establishing their complex structure, the
Framers were virtually obsessed with a fear-bordering on what some might
uncharitably describe as paranoia-of the concentration of political power." This fear
is evidenced by the fact that "the Framers [chose] to rely on a number of different
structural devices [such as dividing sovereignty between the state and federal
governments] to check what they assumed to be the natural and inherent tendency of
government to proceed toward tyranny").
14. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-47 (demonstrating the important role federalism
plays in the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 516, 536 (1997) (detailing the important role that federalism plays in the
Court's interpretation of Congress's power under the Enforcement Clause): United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the
principles of federalism limit Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
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the balance of power between the states and the federal government. 5
Examples of such laws include those that conscript state executive
officers to implement federal regulations, 6 commandeer the state
legislature in an attempt to coerce the state into enacting legislation
that the federal government deems appropriate, 7 and, it appears,
determine the qualifications of state judges.18
In Condon, the Fourth Circuit confronted difficult issues
implicating the constitutional principles of federalism when deciding
whether the DPPA impermissibly intruded upon state sovereignty in
violation of the Tenth Amendment. 9 The Fourth Circuit held that
the DPPA was unconstitutional because it exceeded the limits that the
Tenth Amendment principles of federalism impose on Congress's
exercise of its regulatory power under the Commerce Clause."
15. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-83 (1992).
16. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-33.
17. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174-83.
18. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). The Gregory Court held
that the principles of federalism created a rebuttable interpretational presumption
that the terms of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 did not
encompass state judges. See id. at 460-61. The Court articulated this clear statement
rule because the Court's earlier federalism jurisprudence enunciated in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which declared that the
political process was the states' primary protection against intrusive exercises of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, counseled the Court to require Congress to
unequivocally declare its intent to apply federal regulations in an intrusive manner.
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464. The Court, therefore, did not have to decide whether
the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from determining the qualifications of
state judges, but the Court's opinion intimated that this type of legislation would be
unconstitutional. See id. at 463-64; see also Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of
Federalism, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1447, 1458-59 (1995) (noting that the Gregory decision
was significant because it "marked the beginning of the Tenth Amendment's
rehabilitation" of federalism, not because of the clear statement rule it articulated);
Jack W. Campbell, IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 805, 816 (1998) (stating that the Gregory Court's clear statement rule
"increases Congress's political accountability by forcing it to state explicitly a decision
to erode state authority and reduce the benefits of federalism"); Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
903, 903-05 (1994) (stating that the Gregory Court "suffered a relapse" by relying on
the principles of federalism to create an interpretational presumption instead of
applying regular principles of statutory interpretation to reach the same conclusion).
19. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 460-63 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000).
20. See id. at 457, 463. Although the Fourth Circuit also held that the DPPA was
not a valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment ("Enforcement Clause"), see id. at 465, the Supreme Court did not
address this holding. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671 n.2 (2000) (stating that
although the United States argued below that the DPPA was a valid exercise of
Congress's Enforcement Clause powers, the United States did not raise the issue in
the "petition for certiorari ... [or] briefs to this Court ... and, at oral argument, the
Solicitor General expressly disavowed any reliance on it"). Specifically, the Supreme
Court declined to address whether the privacy interest that the DPPA enforces-the
privacy interest a driver has in personal information, such as his or her name, address,
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According to the Fourth Circuit, the DPPA violated the Tenth
Amendment by forcing the states to administer a federal regulatory
program,21 an impermissible result under the Supreme Court's current
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence as set forth in Nest, York v. United
States' and Printz v. United States.' The Fourth Circuit also held, in
the alternative, that the Commerce Clause does not provide a
constitutional basis for the DPPA even under the Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority24 line of cases' because the
DPPA is not generally applicable.' According to the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of the Garcia line in light of New York and Printz,
"Congress may regulate the conduct of the States [only] through laws
of general applicability."'27 Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's
decision, the Supreme Court granted the United States's petition for
certiorari on May 17, 1999.2
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and
upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA as a valid exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers that did not violate the Tenth
Amendment.2 9 The Court held that the DPPA did not run afoul of
the anti-commandeering principles of federalism enunciated in New
York and Printz.31 Instead of relying on New York and Printz,
however, the Supreme Court upheld the DPPA by relying on South
Carolina v. Baker,3 1 a case in the Garcia line that addressed
Congress's power to remove the tax exempt status of bearer bonds. '
In Baker, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congressional
legislation that effectively required the states to implement a variety
of legislative and administrative changes in order to continue issuing
tax exempt bonds, despite South Carolina's argument that these
requirements forced the states to administer a federal regulatory
phone number, social security number, and medical history-is a right guaranteed by
the term "liberty" in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, a
permissible target of Congress's Enforcement Clause powers. See Condon, 155 F.3d at
463-65; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20, 536 (1997) (providing
the framework for determining whether Enforcement Clause legislation passes
constitutional muster).
21. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
22. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
23. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
24. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
25. The Garcia line of cases, which includes South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505
(1988), allows Congress to regulate the states as states. See infra notes 120-57. These
cases all involved laws that were generally applicable. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
26. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-63.
27. Id. at 462.
28. See Reno v. Condon, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
29. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000).
30. See id. at 668.
31. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
32. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
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program in violation of the Tenth Amendment.3 The Baker Court
stated that this type of "administering" is an inevitable and innocuous
result of federal regulation.34 The Reno Court's opinion, however,
neither clearly explains why the Court relied on Baker, nor addresses
the Fourth Circuit's extremely narrow reading of Garcia in light of
New York and Printz.35 In fact, the Court's decision does not mention
Garcia even once.
The Reno Court expressly reserved for later judicial determination
whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for
Congressional Commerce Clause legislation that applies to the states
as states. 6 The Court found that it need not address this issue because
the DPPA regulates "the universe of entities" that supply motor
vehicle information and, therefore, is a law of general applicability."
The Court's opinion does not relate the significance of its finding that
the DPPA is a law of general applicability to the determination that
Baker governed the instant case, rather than New York and Printz.
The Court's opinion also fails to state why, or if, general applicability
is of constitutional significance.
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Reno by
scrutinizing the DPPA, the recent Supreme Court cases that establish
Tenth Amendment restrictions on Congress's Commerce Clause
powers, the Fourth Circuit's opinion, and the Supreme Court's
decision reversing the Fourth Circuit. This analysis will demonstrate
that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to stabilize its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence39 because the Court failed to acknowledge
33. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 513-15.
34. See id.; see also Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672 (describing the Court's holding in
Baker).
35. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72.
36. See id. at 672.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. The Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to
substantive limitations on Congress's powers is currently in a state of flux. See Bednar
& Eskridge, supra note 18, at 1447. In fact, the Court's "federalism jurisprudence
might.., be described as 'a mess."' Id. The Court has not yet fashioned a workable
framework for determining what types of Congressional Commerce Clause legislation
targeting the states as states violates the Tenth Amendment, as evidenced by the
many reversals and complete turnarounds in this area. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro,
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Redish, supra note 12, at 23 (noting that to
say "the Supreme Court's efforts to develop a principled, coherent approach to its
role as the constitutional arbiter of interfederal disputes have been less than
successful is surely a significant understatement"); Paul J. Mishkin, The Current
Understanding of the Tenth Amendment, in Federalism and the Judicial Mind: Essays
on American Constitutional Law and Politics 149, 150 (Harry N. Scheiber & Amy
Toro eds., 1992) (demonstrating the Court's inability to provide a workable rationale
to determine when, and in what manner, the federal government can regulate the
2548 [Vol. 68
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that its recent decisions reveal that the Garcia line of cases and New
York and Printz are not two distinct lines of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.4° This Comment argues that New York and Printz are
examples of the substantive restrictions discussed in Garcia that are
necessary to protect the states from a defect in the national political
process.4' New York and Printz, two Supreme Court cases
invalidating Commerce Clause legislation on substantive Tenth
Amendment grounds, noted that the challenged legislation was
generally applicable, but focused on whether the legislation in
question led to diminished political accountability for state and
federal governments.42 This Comment contends that legislation that
diminishes political accountability causes a defect in the political
process that triggers substantive Tenth Amendment protections under
Garcia.43 Furthermore, this Comment argues that diminished political
accountability occurs when the federal government forces states to
engage in "uniquely sovereign activities," activities in which only the
states as states can engage. 4
This Comment also argues that recent Supreme Court cases
demonstrate that general applicability is not a constitutional
prerequisite for Congress to regulate the states as states under the
Commerce Clause. Because the Court's Tenth Amendment inquiry
focuses on whether Congressional Commerce Clause legislation
diminishes political accountability by forcing the states as states to
engage in "uniquely sovereign activities," the determination that a law
is generally applicable is merely one indicator of constitutionality.
Generally applicable legislation, by its nature, never forces states to
engage in "uniquely sovereign activities" because private entities, by
definition, cannot engage in sovereign activities. Congressional
Commerce Clause legislation that does not regulate both the states
and private entities in the same statute does not always target
"uniquely sovereign activities," and, therefore, may pass
constitutional muster.
Part I of this Comment describes the legislative history of the
DPPA and its many controversial characteristics. Part II briefly
examines Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause
states as states under the Commerce Clause without violating the Tenth Amendment,
by discussing the many recent reversals in this area); Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme
Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1623, 1623 (1994)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Why the Court] (stating that "[wle are now in the midst of a
confused era for federalism doctrine").
40. See infra Part V.
41. See infra notes 293-318 and accompanying text.
42. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915-16, 920 (1997) (noting that the
challenged legislation was not generally applicable, but focusing on the fact that the
statute diminished political accountability by commandeering the states to regulate
third parties); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (same).
43. See infra Part V.
44. See infra Part V.
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and then examines, through detailed analysis of recent Supreme Court
decisions, the Tenth Amendment restrictions that the principles of
federalism impose on Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Part III
analyzes the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Condon in order to
demonstrate why it does not comport with the recent Supreme Court
cases construing the meaning of the Tenth Amendment. Part IV
describes the reasoning that the Supreme Court employed in Reno to
reverse the Fourth Circuit's decision and uphold the constitutionality
of the DPPA as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers. Finally, Part V explains why, in light of the recent Court
cases, the Reno Court was correct in reversing the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Condon. Part V also argues that the Court missed an
opportunity to stabilize its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence by failing
to embrace a reconceptualization of Garcia, New York, and Printz.
I. THE DPPA
This part analyzes the legislative history of the DPPA by recounting
Congress's reasons for enacting privacy legislation regulating the sale
and dissemination of drivers' personal information. It then describes
the DPPA's provisions and discusses why many courts and
commentators viewed the Act as unconstitutional.
On July 18, 1989, Rebecca Schaeffer, an actress on the popular
television sitcom "My Sister Sam," was murdered on the doorstep of
her home by Robert Bardo.45 Bardo, an obsessed fan, obtained
Schaeffer's address from the California DMV for five dollars.46
Although Schaeffer had taken steps to ensure that her address and
phone number were not publicly known, Bardo obtained from the
DMV the personal information about Schaeffer that provided him
with the opportunity to kill her.47 Schaeffer's murder drew public
45. See Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 88; Darrell Dawsey & Eric Malnic,
Actress Rebecca Schaeffer Fatally Shot at Apartment, L.A. Times, July 19, 1989, at 1
(describing the tragic murder of the young actress); see also Hartzell-Jordan, supra
note 8, at 217 (recounting the events surrounding the tragic murder of Rebecca
Schaeffer); Rachel F. Preiser, Note, Staking Out the Border Between Commandeering
and Conditional Preemption: Is the Driver's Privacy Protection Act Constitutional
Under the Tenth Amendment?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 514, 514 (1999) (describing the tragic
events leading up to ) the murder of Rebecca Schaeffer to explain Congress's motive
for enacting the DPPA).
46. See Kim, supra note 9, at 223; see also Lind & Eckart, supra note 8, at 18
("Rebecca Schaeffer was killed by an obsessed fan [who]... was able to locate
Schaeffer's home after he hired a private investigator who obtained the actress's
address by accessing her California motor vehicle record . .. ."); Tracey Wilkinson,
Murder Suspect's 'Obsession' Foretold in Studio Visit, L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1989, pt. II,
at 1 (describing how Bardo, after unsuccessfully attempting to meet Schaeffer at the
television studio, hired a private detective who obtained Schaeffer's address).
47. See Brief for Petitioners at 5, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (No. 98-
1464), available in 1999 WL 513843 (discussing the "threats to privacy and personal
safety from disclosure of personal information held in state DMV records" by noting
the "murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, who had taken pains to ensure that her
[Vol. 682550
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attention to the ease with which stalkers, robbers, and murderers
could obtain sensitive personal information from a variety of sources,
including DMVs.4s
State DMVs do not release the type of personal information Bardo
obtained about Schaeffer for free. Instead, they sell it to both
businesses and individuals at a substantial profit. 9 For example, the
New York DMV collected $17 million in fees in one year from the
sale of drivers' personal information.-" The Wisconsin DMV raises
approximately $8 million in revenue annually from these sales.5' As
the states have discovered, "the personal information contained in
state DMV records has considerable commercial value... [because
the information sold] is used extensively to support the direct-
marketing efforts of businesses."'
After Schaeffer's highly publicized murder, Congress and the states
responded quickly to the public outcry over stalking and the ease with
which criminals could obtain personal information about their
victims.5 State legislatures focused their energies on enacting a
variety of criminal anti-stalking laws.' Congress, on the other hand,
conducted hearings on Schaeffer's murder and similar incidents of
criminals using state motor vehicle records to harm victims.55 After
determining that the commercial use of drivers' personal information
by the DMVs created serious privacy and safety concerns, Congress,
pursuant to its Commerce Clause and Enforcement Clause powers,
passed the DPPA in 1994.6
address and phone number were not publicly listed").
48. See id. at 4-5; Wilkinson, supra note 46.
49. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
931 (2000); Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, Condon (No. 98-1464).
50. See Protecting Driver Privacy: Hearings on H.R. 3365 Before the Subconmn.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Coinn., 103d Cong. (1994)
(testimony of Janlori Goldman, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's
Privacy and Technology Project), available in 1994 WL 212813 at *6.
51. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2000); Travis, 163 F3d at 1002; see
also Brief for Petitioners at 4, Condon (No. 98-1464) (noting that the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation earns $8 million per year from selling drivers' personal
information).
52. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Condon (No. 98-1464).
53. See id. at 5; see also Odom & Feder, supra note 8. at 88-89 (discussing how
both federal and state anti-stalking legislation was enacted following the murder of
Rebecca Schaeffer); Kim, supra note 9, at 224 ("Shocked by the relative ease Nith
which Bardo obtained Schaeffer's home address," legislators in California enacted
information privacy measures and Congress enacted the DPPA).
54. See Odom & Feder, supra note 8. at 88-89 (noting that in response to
Schaeffer's murder, California enacted criminal laws penalizing stalking itself and that
by 1993, the other 49 States had followed California's lead by enacting laws to
penalize the act of stalking).
55. See Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Condon (No. 98-1464).
56. See id at 3-8; see also Recent Cases, 112 Harv. L Rev. 1100, 1100 (1998)
("Congress enacted the DPPA to discourage the 'active commerce' in and 'easy
availability' of personal information obtained via motor vehicle records.").
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The DPPA generally prohibits "a State department of motor
vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof... [from]
knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person
or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the
department in connection with a motor vehicle record."57  The
statutory definition of "personal information" includes an individual's
name, address, telephone number, driver's identification number,
social security number, medical and disability information, and
photograph. 8
To ensure substantial compliance with this general prohibition, the
DPPA imposes both criminal and civil penalties on individuals who
impermissibly obtain drivers' personal information. Under certain
circumstances, DMVs and their employees may also be subject to
penalties if they release information in violation of the Act.5 9 The
DPPA imposes a criminal fine upon any person, including a DMV
worker, who knowingly discloses or obtains personal information
from a motor vehicle record.' The DPPA also fines "[a]ny State
department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of
substantial noncompliance ... not more than $5,000 a day for each
day of substantial noncompliance."'" Section 2724 of the DPPA
grants a private cause of action against any individual who knowingly
obtains, uses, or discloses a driver's personal information for purposes
not permitted by section 2721(b).6 2 Section 2721(b) of the DPPA sets
forth mandatory exceptions that require state DMVs to disclose
personal information for use in connection with matters of motor
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994); see also Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 77-78
(calling this prohibition the Act's "centerpiece").
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). This definition, however, does not include the
driver's zip code, accident record, driving violations, or whether the driver's license
has been revoked or suspended. See id.; see also Karras, supra note 9, at 132
(discussing which pieces of information about an individual are encompassed by the
statutory term "personal information").
59. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723, 2724; see also Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 670, 672
(2000) (stating that the DPPA imposes fines and penalties on DMVs and DMV
employees that "hang over the States as a potential punishment should they fail to
comply with the Act"); Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting the
substantial penalties the DPPA imposes on DMVs and DMV workers), vacated, 120
S. Ct. 929 (2000); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing the
fact that the DMVs must comply with the DPPA or face substantial penalties), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000). See generally Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 87-88
(describing the potential penalties and remedies that the DPPA provides).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2723(a); supra note 59.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b); see supra note 59.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). Because the DPPA allows drivers to bring suit
against individuals but not against states, the Act does not raise potential Eleventh
Amendment concerns. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1331-33 (M.D. Ala.
1998), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); Karras, supra note 9, at 140-42; see also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (describing state immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment). An in-depth discussion of the Eleventh Amendment is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor
vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance
monitoring [of cars and car dealers]... to carry out the purposes
of... the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information
Disclosure Act... [and] the Clean Air Act.63
The DPPA also provides discretionary exemptions that permit
DMVs to disclose drivers' personal information under certain
circumstances.' For example, these exceptions permit disclosure for
use by the courts and law enforcement agencies;5 in connection with
car and driver safety;66 by a business, though only if the information is
used to verify the accuracy of incorrect information given by the
individual, to prevent fraud by the individual, or to pursue legal
remedies against the individual;67 in connection with a legal
proceeding in federal, state, or local courts;' in research and statistical
reports only if the personal information "is not published, redisclosed,
or used to contact individuals;"'69 in connection with insurance claim
investigation, anti-fraud activities, rating, and underwriting;W° "in
providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles;"' by
a licensed private investigator or security service for a permissible
purpose under the DPPA;r  and for use "by an employer or its agent
or insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a
commercial driver's license that is required under chapter 313 of title
49."73 Although the DPPA also originally permitted states to disclose
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (citations omitted); see also Reno,
120 S. Ct. at 669 (recognizing that "[tihe DPPA's prohibition of nonconsensual
disclosures [of personal information] is also subject to a number of statutory
exceptions" enumerated in Section 2721(b)); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d. 453, 456 (4th
Cir. 1998) (stating that section 2721(b) "specifies a list of exceptions when personal
information contained in a State motor vehicle record may be obtained and used"),
rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 78 (discussing the
mandatory exceptions to the DPPA provided by section 2721(b), which require
DMVs to diclose a driver's personal information under certain circumstances).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1)-(14) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also Pryor, 171
F.3d at 1283 (iterating some of the circumstances under which the DPPA permits
DMVs to disclose a driver's personal information); Travis, 163 F3d at 1002 (same);
Karras, supra note 9, at 129-32 (same); Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 83-86 (same).
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1).
66. See id. § 2721(b)(2).
67. See id. § 2721(b)(3).
68. See id § 2721(b)(4).
69. See id. § 2721(b)(5).
70. See id. § 2721(b)(6).
71. See id § 2721(b)(7).
72. See id § 2721(b)(8). Even if the DPPA was in effect prior to Schaeffer's
death, Bardo could probably still have obtained her personal information from the
DMV, however, because this permissible disclosure provision allows DMVs to
provide information to private detective agencies. See Odom & Feder, supra note 8,
at 89 ("The DPPA... allows States to provide personal information to private
detective agencies, the very type of intermediary Bardo successfully employed to
obtain Schaeffer's address.").
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(9).
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a driver's information to anyone for any reason if they allowed drivers
to prohibit such disclosure by opting out,74 in 1999, Congress amended
the DPPA to permit states to disclose drivers' personal information
only if the DMVs affirmatively receive a driver's consent to do so
through the use of an opt-in provision.75 Under the amended DPPA,
therefore, states can only disclose a drivers' personal information for
any purpose if they receive an individual's affirmative consent to do
SO.
7 6
Courts and commentators criticized the DPPA for intruding into an
area that the states have traditionally regulated." Critics of the DPPA
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11).
75. See Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350(c), reprinted in 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. 986, 1025. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Condon, the
DPPA contained the opt-out requirement which allowed DMVs to disclose drivers'
personal information to anyone if they provided drivers an opportunity to prevent
such disclosures by opting out. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11); Reno v. Condon, 120 S.
Ct. 666, 669 (2000); see also Karras, supra note 9, at 131 (stating that "[t]he 'opt-out'
choice constitute[d] one final and crucial provision of section 2721" because it allowed
states to disclose a driver's personal information to any person or entity if the states
gave drivers written notice allowing them the opportunity to prevent such disclosure).
Congress "changed this 'opt-out' alternative to an 'opt-in' requirement." Reno, 120 S.
Ct. at 669. The amended DPPA "opt-in" provision requires states to "obtain a
driver's affirmative consent to disclose the driver's personal information." Id.; see also
Act of Oct. 9, 1999, § 350(c)-(e) (stating that the opt-in requirement requires states to
get a driver's affirmative consent to sell and disseminate personal information for any
reason).
These amendments made compliance with the DPPA a prerequisite for receiving
federal funding for the state Departments of Transportation ("DOTs") but provided
that the amendments would not go into effect in South Carolina, Wisconsin, or
Oklahoma until the decision in Reno. See Act of Oct. 9, 1999, § 350(a)-(b), (f, (g),
reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 986, 1025-26. This exercise of Congress's Spending
Clause powers apparently responded to language in New York and O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Printz, which suggested that the Supreme Court would uphold
the legislation invalidated in those cases if compliance were conditioned on the
receipt of federal funds. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Congress could have achieved the goals of the
invalidated legislation by conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance with
its provisions); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (noting that
Congress could have validly enacted the challenged legislation under the Spending
Clause); see also Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (D. Kan. 1998)
("IT]he Supreme Court in New York and Printz held that the statutes at issue in those
cases were unconstitutional even though it specifically recognized that both statutes
could have been lawfully passed pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power.").
This apparent inconsistency between Congress's authority under the Spending and
Commerce Clauses is justified because legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause does not always provide states a true choice as to whether or not to administer
a federal program. See Kansas, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1199-1200; infra notes 317-25 and
accompanying text.
76. See supra note 75.
77. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
operation of DMVs is a sovereign activity in which states have traditionally engaged),
vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000); see also Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 100-01 (noting
that states have traditionally operated DMVs and regulated the disclosure of
information contained in motor vehicle records through state legislation). The
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have emphasized that the statute forced DMVs to change the way
they currently sold and disseminated drivers' personal information.a
In addition, courts reviewing the constitutionality of the DPPA have
noted that compliance is difficult because of the Act's prolixity and
complexity.79 The myriad of mandatory and discretionary exceptions
to the DPPA has led commentators to note that "[tihe breadth of the
list of enumerated users of the driver information, and the absence of
controls over their conduct, makes the restriction on the access and
use of the information ineffective."' Critics have also alleged that the
DPPA forces the states to administer a federal regulatory program.
Since the invention of the car, states have been the only entities that
have operated DMVs, issued driver licenses, registered vehicles, and
collected and disseminated the information pertaining to those
transactions.8' The states have traditionally determined the scope and
conditions of disclosure of personal information contained in motor
vehicle records through state legislation.' For example, South
Carolina provided that an individual could obtain a driver's personal
information only if the DMV provided drivers the opportunity to opt-
Eleventh Circuit's statement in Pryor is similar to the "traditional governmental
functions" test enunciated in the now-overruled decision of National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849-52 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See also infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text
(discussing in greater detail the Court's rejection of the traditional governmental
functions test enunciated in Usery as unworkable in practice and contrary to the very
principles of federalism upon which the case purportedly rested). But see Travis v.
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the DPPA, but suggesting that
the principles of federalism enunciated in User), are truer to the Constitution than the
principles enunciated in Garcia), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000).
7& See Odom & Feder, supra note 8. at 100-01 (noting that states have
traditionally operated DMVs and regulated the disclosure of information contained in
motor vehicle records through state legislation).
79. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that -Ithe
undisputed evidence submitted establishes that implementation of the DPPA would
impose substantial costs and effort on the part of the Department [of Motor Vehicles]
in order for it to achieve compliance") (quoting Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977,
981 (D.S.C. 1997), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); see also Odom & Feder, supra note 8,
at 113 ("The States challenging the DPPA have presented uncontradicted testimony
calculating the added expense the States must bear in order to comply with the
DPPA's dictates.").
80. Bill Loving, DMV Secrecy: Stalking and Suppression of Speed Rights, 4
Comm. L. Conspectus 203, 212 (1996); see also Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data
Protection Directive and the First Amendment: Whky a "Press Eremption" Won't
Work, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 639, 644 (1995) (stating that in light of all of its exceptions, the
DPPA is an ineffective anti-stalking measure because the suggestion that it will stop
stalkers is "misleading at best, and fraudulent at worst").
81. See Odom & Feder, supra note 8, at 98 ("Traditionally, States have
determined for themselves the scope and conditions of disclosure of information
contained in their records: the overwhelming majority historically have treated motor
vehicle records as public records.").
82. See id at 98-99 (noting that "a vast majority of States have long recognized the
public good that flows from open records and open government").
2000] 2555
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
out of the State's disclosure scheme.83 The South Carolina statute also
required individuals who requested drivers' personal information to
give the state their name and address and to stipulate that the
information would not be used for phone solicitation.' Because the
DPPA is a constitutional federal law, state laws that directly conflict
with the Act, such as the South Carolina statute which fails to satisfy
the minimal federal standards established by the DPPA, are invalidY
The DPPA's many complex mandatory and discretionary disclosure
provisions" make compliance with its provisions difficult. To comply
with the DPPA, numerous state DMVs have had to make many costly
changes. These changes include conducting extensive training for
employees in the circumstances under which they can release drivers'
personal information, and changing the procedures that DMVs use
when handling requests for driver information.87  The DPPA,
therefore, forces states to change the way they operate and train
employees as a prerequisite to continuing to sell and disseminate
drivers' personal information.18
Some states challenged the constitutionality of the DPPA on the
grounds that it forces state entities to administer federal regulations in
contravention of the Tenth Amendment. These states argued that the
DPPA forced DMVs to administer a federal regulatory program in
violation of the principles of federalism enunciated in New York and
Printz, because the DPPA forces non-compliant DMVs to adopt new
rules, establish new mechanisms for determining when a mandatory or
discretionary disclosure situation exists, take certain actions in
response to requests for the information, and train workers to
conform with the complex regulations, or pay penalties for failing to
"administer" the DPPA.89 In response to the DPPA's enactment,
some states filed suits challenging its constitutionality." In order to
83. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-540 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); see also Reno v.
Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 670 (2000) (discussing the provisions of the South Carolina
statute, which regulated the disclosure of drivers' personal information); Condon v.
Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that the South Carolina statute
regulating the disclosure and dissemination of DMV records varies significantly from
the DPPA), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
84. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-510(1).
85. The South Carolina statute regulating the dissemination of personal
information, although in direct conflict with federal legislation, is unconstitutional
only because the DPPA is a valid federal law. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 27-28 (1824) (holding that state laws that conflict with
valid federal laws are unconstitutional because they violate the Supremacy Clause).
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
87. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1323-24 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
88. See id. at 1324.
89. See, e.g., Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Wisconsin seeks
to persuade us that the [DPPA] has the same vice as the statutes condemned in Printz
and New York."), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000).
90. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 922 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd, 163 F.3d
1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Pryor, 998 F. Supp. at 1322; Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't
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analyze the viability of these constitutional challenges, the next part
presents the doctrinal background governing the Tenth Amendment's
limitations on Congress's ability to regulate the states as states under
the Commerce Clause.
II. THE RESTRICTIONS THE TENTH AMENDMENT IMPOSES ON
CONGRESS'S COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS
This part analyzes the scope of Congress's authority to regulate
activity engaged in by the states as states. After briefly describing
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, it discusses the Tenth
Amendment limitations on those powers by revisiting recent Supreme
Court decisions in this area.
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power... [tlo regulate Commerce.. . among the several States."' In
United States v. Lopez,' the Supreme Court held that Congress,
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, can regulate objects in
interstate Commerce,93 the channels of interstate Commerce, and
of Pub. Safety v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (W.D. Okla. 1998). rev'd, 161
F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997).
affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998).
91. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 3.; see also Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 450 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("The Commerce Clause forms the broadest base of Congressional power.
The power is 'complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution."' (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (footnote omitted)): Frederick H.
Cooke, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution 66 (1908) (noting that
Congress's Commerce Clause powers can be utilized to regulate an -infinite variety"
of subjects).
92. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Courts have noted that "Lopez is a landmark, signaling
the revival of federalism as a constitutional principle, and it must be acknowledged as
a watershed decision in the history of the Commerce Clause." United States v. Bailey,
115 F.3d 1222, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Cooke, supra note
91, at 66 (stating that Congress's Commerce Clause power is "'plenary, complete in
itself, and may be exerted by Congress to its utmost extent").
93. For example, in Champion v. Antes, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). the Court held that
Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the sale of lottery
tickets because they were articles in interstate commerce. The Court in Ames noted
that "in determining the character of the regulations to be adopted Congress has a
large discretion which is not to be controlled by the courts, simply because, in [the
courts'] opinion, such regulations may not be the best or most effective that could be
employed." Id. at 353; see also Cooke, supra note 91, at 66 (stating that the
Constitution granted Congress a large amount of leeway in determining what type of
legislation to utilize in order to regulate interstate commerce). Similarly. in Acorn r.
Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit held that Congress had the
power to regulate drinking water coolers in order to prevent lead contamination
because water coolers were articles in interstate commerce. See id. at 1394. The court
in Acorn, however, went on to hold that the legislation at issue violated the Tenth
Amendment because it forced the states to regulate in accordance with a
Congressional mandate. See id.
94. Courts have noted that the Commerce Clause unquestionably grants Congress
the power to regulate the navigable waters of the United States. See United States v.
Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 608 (3d Cir. 1974); see also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
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activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.95 Congress's
Commerce Clause powers are plenary, and therefore, the Supreme
Court does not consider Congress's motive or purpose for enacting
particular regulations when determining the constitutionality of those
laws.96 For example, in Katzenbach v. McClung,97 the Court held that
Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, could regulate
discrimination against blacks in a small local restaurant, even though
Congress's motive in enacting the legislation was to effectuate social
change in the South.98
Although Congress's power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause is plenary, the exercise of this power is limited by the
constitutional principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth
Amendment.99 The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers
(10 Wall.) 557, 564-65 (1870) (stating that Congress has the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the navigable waters of the United States that are used
in interstate commerce); United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486, 489-93 (M.D.
Fla. 1972) (same).
95. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. For example, in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), the Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate local working conditions because that intrastate activity had a
substantial affect on interstate commerce. See id. at 109-11, 115, 119-20; see also
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-20, 125, 128-29 (1942) (holding that Congress
can regulate, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, any activity no matter how
local, if the cumulative effects of the intrastate activity substantially affect interstate
commerce). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence indicates that Congress has the authority to
regulate intrastate activities that "significantly affect" interstate commerce).
Similarly, in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the Court held that Congress
validly enacted criminal legislation prohibiting loansharking under its Commerce
Clause powers, even though government prosecutors did not have to prove that a
particular loanshark's activity affected interstate commerce as an element of the
crime. See id. at 147 n.1, 154-56. The Court upheld this legislation because it
considered loansharking to be in a "class of activities" that substantially affected
interstate commerce. See id. at 154-56. The Perez Court stated that "[e]xtortionate
credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may ... affect interstate commerce" and
that "there is a tie-in between local loan sharks and interstate crime." Id.; see also
Redish, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that loansharking had a substantial connection to
interstate commerce because it was the second largest source of revenue for
organized crime). The Supreme Court in Lopez noted the importance of
Congressional findings, investigations, and hearings in Perez that proved that
loansharking substantially affected interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-
63 ("[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question [(possessing a gun near a school)]
substantially affected interstate commerce... they are lacking here.").
96. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
97. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
98. See id. at 296, 303-05; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 243, 257, 261-62 (1964) (upholding Congressional Commerce Clause
legislation prohibiting motels from discriminating against blacks even though
Congress's motive in enacting the legislation was the elimination of segregation and
racial discrimination, not fixing a commercial problem).
99. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583
(Kennedy, J., concurring); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992); see
also Acorn v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the principles
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not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.""l° Thus, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
infringing upon areas reserved to the states by the Constitution.""'
The Constitution establishes a federal system of dual sovereignty by
granting the federal government only certain enumerated powers
while reserving to the states all powers that the states possessed at the
time of ratification that had not been delegated to the Federal
government, or expressly prohibited by the Constitution."C The
Framers, by "split[ting] the atom of sovereignty," created two
separate political entities, one federal and one state, each responsive
to its citizens' needs and "each protected from incursion by the
other."103
Thus, the federal system provided by the Constitution establishes a
balance of power between the state and federal governments by
allocating only certain limited powers to the federal government.' "
of federalism enunciated in New York prohibit Congress from exercising its
Commerce Clause powers to force states to administer federal regulatory programs).
City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(recognizing that "[iut is now well settled that the Tenth Amendment and the
principles of federalism inherent in the structure of the Constitution limit the ways in
which Congress can require action by the states in pursuit of federal policies");
Melissa Ann Jones, Note, Legislating Gun Control in Light of Printz v. United States,
32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 455, 464 (1999) (recognizing that the Tenth Amendment
imposes substantive limits on Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause powers).
100. U.S. Const. amend. X.
101. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263 (1999) ("Although the Constitution
grants broad powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation.").
102. See U.S. Const. arts. I-III; see also U.S. Const. Amend. X (reaffirming the
notion embodied throughout the Constitution that the federal government possesses
only the enumerated powers); Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247 (noting that the Constitution
established a limited federal government by granting only certain enumerated
powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that the Constitution established a federal government with enumerated, and
hence limited, powers); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the Framers and Ratifiers granted only certain enumerated powers
to the federal government); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991) (same).
103. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the "Constitution created a legal system ... establishing two
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set
of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it").
The framers further divided the powers granted to the federal government among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. See Alden. 119 S. Ct. at 2247 ("The
limited and enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive. and Judicial
Branches of the National Government... underscore the vital role reserved to the
States by the constitutional design."). This separation of powers, and the concomitant
system of checks and balances, further ensures that the federal government will not
become tyrannous. See Redish, supra note 12, at 4.
104. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi ("FERC"). 456 U.S.
742, 790 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
the Framers and Ratifiers attempted to curb the "evils" of central authority by
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This system was not established for the benefit of the states; instead
"the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection [and benefit of the American
people]."' 5 Thus, the principles of federalism inherent in the federal
system prohibit Congress from exercising its Commerce Clause
powers in a manner that intrudes upon the fundamental aspects of
state sovereignty because this usurpation would upset the balance of
power established by the Constitution and, therefore, potentially
subject the people to a tyrannous federal government. 0 6
In cases implicating the Tenth Amendment, the Court analyzes the
constitutionality of Congressional legislation by focusing either on
whether an enumerated power, such as the Commerce Clause, grants
allocating "power between [the] state[s] and national authorities, and divid[ing] the
national power among [the] three branches of [the federal] government"). Justice
O'Connor stated in FERC that "[u]nless we zealously protect these distinctions[]
[between state and federal powers] we risk upsetting the balance of power that
buttresses our basic liberties." Id.
105. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); see also Gregory, 501
U.S. at 458-59 (stating that the federal system benefits the people in a myriad of ways,
including: ensuring a government that is more sensitive to the needs of a
heterogeneous society; increasing the opportunities for democratic involvement in the
political process; allowing more innovation and experimentation in government; and,
most importantly, establishing a "double security" system that places checks on the
abuses of government); Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 18, at 1467 (emphasizing that
a federal system can satisfy the economic needs and political preferences of a
heterogeneous society better than a centralized system); James F. Blumstein,
Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 Vand. L.
Rev. 1251, 1253 (1994) (recognizing the crucial role that federalism plays in
empowering geographically based minorities in the political system by protecting
political minorities from the tyranny of the majority); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism
and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2217-
27 (1998) (stating that federalism achieves important values, such as creating
alternative locations of power, and criticizing Professors Rubin and Feeley for not
recognizing the important interests served by these values). But see Rubin & Feeley,
supra note 18, at 909, 917-20, 923-25 (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court should never
invoke [the principles of] federalism as a reason for invalidating" Congressional
legislation because federalism does not ensure that government will be more sensitive
to the needs of a heterogeneous society); see also Frank B. Cross, Essay, Realism
About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1304, 1304-05 (1999) (arguing that "federalism
does not... have authentic legal significance as a principled constraint on the power
of the national government," and that giving "significance to federalism will [lead to
]... unprincipled, arbitrary judicial decisionmaking [sic] that can disrupt the
functioning and accountability of Congress"); Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality
and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1009, 1014 (1997) (noting that
there is serious question as to whether federalism "is a valuable, indeed essential
mechanism for achieving" political goals, such as increased citizen participation in the
democratic process, innovation and experimentation, government responsiveness, and
the promise of liberty). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism,
47 Fla. L. Rev. 499, 524, 526-39 (1995) (noting how the values attributed to federalism
by the Supreme Court are "seldom more than just slogans," but stating that
federalism does promote important values); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of
Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1229, 1230-46 (1994)
(discussing the four major views of federalism and noting why they are inadequate).
106. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-64.
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Congress the power to pass the law, or on whether the legislation
"invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment." 107 As the New York Court observed, each inquiry is a
"mirror image" of the other because if the Constitution grants
Congress a particular power, then the Tenth Amendment expressly
provides that the power is not reserved to the states; and "if a power is
an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment,""8 then the Constitution has not granted Congress that
power. It has not always been clear, however, what types of federal
legislation violate the Tenth Amendment." 9 In order to analyze how
that determination is made, the following sections present the recent
Supreme Court decisions in this area.
107. New York, 505 U.S. at 155.
108. Id. at 156.
109. In the past, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment's
restrictions on Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause powers has not been a
model of consistency, to say the very least. See supra note 39. For example, during
certain periods in history, Congress did not have the constitutional authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate mining, manufacturing, agriculture, or the
minimum wage and overtime benefits of non-professional state workers because the
Supreme Court held that constitutional principles of federalism prohibited federal
regulation in those areas. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 848-52
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531
(1985); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289-97 (1936); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 63-64, 77-78 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 275-77 (1918),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941). At present,
however, Tenth Amendment restrictions on Congress's Commerce Clause power
have significantly decreased. For example, since 1937, the Supreme Court has held
that the Commerce Clause enables Congress to regulate mining, manufacturing, and
agriculture, and since 1985, Congress has had the authority to regulate the minimum
wage and overtime benefits of non-professional state workers. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at
546-50, 555-56; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-24 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 30-31 (1937); see also Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 153-54
(1942) (noting that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate
intrastate activities such as manufacturing); cf Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 574, 585 (1937) (holding that an excise tax imposed on employers by the Social
Security Act did not coerce the state in violation of "the Tenth Amendment or ...
[the] restrictions implicit in our federal form of government"). Steward Machine
bucked a trend in a line of cases, including Bailey r. Drexrel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20,
36-38,41 (1922), in which the Supreme Court invalidated federal taxes on the ground
that these "taxes" were really an attempt by Congress to regulate an area reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment. See Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590-92.
Although the Tenth Amendment limitations on Congress's regulatory power have
decreased substantially since the Great Depression, the Tenth Amendment still
prohibits Congress from enacting certain types of legislation, such as laws that
conscript state executive officers to implement federal regulations or laws that
commandeer the state legislatures by coercing the state into enacting legislation the
federal government deems appropriate. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926-
34 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
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A. National League of Cities v. Usery
In National League of Cities v. Usery,"0 the Supreme Court struck
down the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), which extended minimum wage and overtime
requirements to all non-professional state workers, because they
violated the Tenth Amendment by impairing the states' ability to
function effectively in the federal system."' In Usery, the Court noted
that although Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce
Clause is plenary,' the federal system of government limits
Congress's authority to regulate the states pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers." 3 The Court derived this limitation from the structure
of the Constitution, the principles of federalism, and the Tenth
Amendment itself, which "expressly declares the constitutional policy
that Congress may not exercise [its] power in a fashion that impairs
the States' ... ability to function effectively in a federal system."" 4
The Usery Court also expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz," 5 a case
that held that the extension of the FLSA to state hospital and school
workers was a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers that did not violate the Tenth Amendment." 6 Supplanting the
Wirtz decision, the Court ruled that the 1974 amendments to the
FLSA exceeded Congress's authority because the challenged
amendments regulated the states in an area of traditional
governmental function, and therefore violated the Tenth
Amendment."7
The Usery Court established the "traditional governmental
functions" test to help it determine whether Congressional legislation
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause violates the substantive
110. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
111. See id. at 835-39; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism:
Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, 1564-65 (1994) (noting that
the Usery Court based its decision on the outdated territorial model of federalism,
which insulates certain areas from federal regulation).
112. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
113. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 842.
114. Id. at 842-44 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
115. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 840 (1976).
116. See id. at 186-87, 193, 196-99. The Wirtz Court used a balancing test that
weighed the federal and state interests at stake in determining whether legislation
that targets the states as states violates the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 198-99.
117. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (holding that "insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress"); see also Blumstein, supra note 105, at 1283 (noting that
the Usery Court held that the Tenth Amendment enforces substantive limits on




limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment."' Although the Usery
Court attempted to define and protect specific areas of state activity
that must be immune from federal intrusion to protect the sovereignty
of the states from federal overreaching, this test ultimately proved
unworkable." 9
B. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
In 1974, when the FLSA amendments were enacted, the San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority ("SAMTA") complied with
the amendment's minimum wage and overtime requirements. But
when the Usery Court held that the FLSA could not be applied to the
states in areas of traditional governmental function, SAMTA ceased
to comply." Subsequently, the Wage and Hour Administration of
the Department of Labor issued an opinion stating that despite
Usery's holding, SAMTA was not immune from application of the
FLSA minimum wage and overtime requirements because operating a
mass transit system was not a traditional governmental function.
SAMTA brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that its
operations were entitled to Tenth Amendment immunity from
application of FLSA's overtime requirements because under Usery,
the operation of a mass transportation system was a traditional
governmental function and therefore immune from federal regulation.
The Supreme Court thereby gained the opportunity in Garcia to
reconsider the constitutional soundness of its determination in
Usery. 1m In Garcia, the Court noted that the FLSA was a law of
118. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851-52. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981), the Court held that Congressional
Commerce Clause legislation violates the principles of federalism enunciated in User
if the legislation: (1) regulates the states as states; (2) targets matters that are clearly
attributes of state sovereignty; and (3) impairs the states' "ability 'to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."' See also Mishkin, supra
note 39, at 151 (stating that the Hodel Court clarified the vague principles of
federalism discussed in Usery by creating a three-part test to determine whether
Congressional Commerce Clause legislation violates the Tenth Amendment).
119. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539-43 (1985)(holding that the "traditional governmental functions" test was unworkable in
practice and contrary to the very principles of federalism upon which it purportedly
rested); infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at
1566 (noting that "[n]either the language of the Tenth Amendment nor political
theory... [has] succeeded in defining a unique circle of 'traditional governmental
functions' reserved to the states"); Tushnet, Why the Court, supra note 39, at 1626-27
(discussing the Court's decade-long struggle to apply the principles of federalism
enunciated in Usery before finally overruling the case in Garcia).
120. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 532-34.
121. Compare id. at 550-55 (holding that the states' role in the national political
process, not judicially enforced spheres of unregulable state activity, is the principal
means to protect the role of the states in the federal system), with User,, 426 U.S. at
849-52 (establishing the "traditional governmental functions" test to determine which
state activities should be insulated from federal regulation in order to ensure the role
of the states in the federal system). The "traditional governmental functions" test was
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general applicability because it applied to private entities as well as
the states, and therefore, the states merely had to comply with the
same regulations as did private entities. 22 The Court interpreted
Usery's inquiry into whether a particular governmental function was
"traditional" in nature as merely a "means of determining whether the
federal statute at issue unduly handicaps 'basic state prerogatives'...
[without] offer[ing] an explanation of what makes one state function a
'basic prerogative' and another function not basic."'" The Garcia
Court, however, objected to the very nature of an inquiry based "on a
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is...
'traditional,"' and consequently overruled Usery because the Court
considered such a test unworkable and contrary to the principles of
federalism upon which it purportedly rested)24
The Garcia Court announced two major objections to the
"traditional governmental functions" test. First, the Court found the
test unworkable because it required the divination of which state
functions are traditional. The Court deemed this a difficult and
troublesome task in which the constitutional distinctions between
regulable and unregulable state activity are "elusive at best."'" In
support of this conclusion, the Court cited many lower court cases that
struggled with, and inconsistently applied, the holding in Usery as
evidence that the "traditional governmental functions" test was
unworkable.126 For example, the lower courts determined that the
regulation of traffic on public roads27 and the regulation of air
transportation'18 were not traditional governmental functions, but
determined that ambulance services'2 ' and licensing automobile
drivers30 were traditional governmental functions and thus immune
from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.3 3 The Garcia
Court also found the "traditional governmental functions" test to be
intended to aid the court in determining violations of the Tenth Amendment by
identifying certain fundamental areas of state sovereignty that could not be regulated
without impairing the states' ability to function effectively in a federal system. See
supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. The Garcia Court thus had to determine
whether the Tenth Amendment principles of federalism prohibited the federal
government from regulating state commercial activity based solely on whether the law
regulated the states in an area of "traditional governmental function." See Garcia, 469
U.S. at 536-37.
122. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537.
123. Id. at 540.
124. Id. at 546-47.
125. Id. at 539.
126. See id. at 538-39.
127. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25,38-39 (2d Cir. 1977).
128. See Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 644 F.2d 1334, 1340
(9th Cir. 1981).
129. See Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-69
(W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 1005, 1017 (8th Cir. 1983).
130. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978).
131. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538.
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contrary to the principles of federalism because the test required
federal courts to determine what state activities are unregulable,
thereby allowing the judiciary to encourage state activity it approves
of and discourage activity it dislikes.'32 The Court noted that this
judicial power might discourage states from experimenting with new,
unorthodox programs in which state citizens choose to engage, and
consequently hinders the states' ability to act as the laboratories for
social and economic experimentation envisioned by the
Constitution.133
The Garcia Court subsequently determined what constitutional
restrictions the Tenth Amendment imposes on Congress's ability to
regulate activity in which the states as states engage.' -' The Garcia
Court observed that although one can easily recognize that the
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment impose
restrictions on Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause power, it is
extremely difficult to define the nature and content of those
restrictions.35 Consequently, the Court concluded that the role of the
states in the federal system is guaranteed by the structure of the
federal government, and not by judicial enforcement of substantive
Tenth Amendment restrictions on Congress's enumerated powers13t
The Court explained that the structure of the federal government, as
set forth in the Constitution, guarantees that state interests will be
protected from Congressional overreaching because the states play a
crucial role in the national political process. This role is pivotal
because the individuals elected to Congress come from the states, and
each state receives equal representation in the Senate as well as
proportional representation in the House of Representatives.,' Thus,
the Garcia Court held that the constitutional limitations on Congress's
132. See id. at 543-47. Under this view, the unelected judiciary should not make
personal judgments about the validity of legislation passed by the democratically
elected Congress based on their own opinion of whether the law was a good idea. See
id.; Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional
Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 82-86 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, The New
Constitutional Order]. One view of the judiciary's role holds that it exists solely to
determine whether a law violates the Constitution, not to make a political judgment
about the soundness of decisions made by the people through their elected
representatives. See id. at 82-86.
133. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-47.
134. See id. at 547-55.
135. See id. at 547.
136. See id. at 550.
137. See id. at 551; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that a reasonable interpretation of the intent of the
Framers and Ratifiers is that they entrusted the protection of the federal system to
the political process, not the judiciary); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalisnr The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of tile National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558 (1954) (stating that the political process in
general, and "the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central




exercise of its Commerce Clause powers are principally procedural,
and therefore "[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural
nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate
for possible failings in the national political process."'38 Under this
framework, the Court held that the FLSA minimum wage and
overtime requirements, as applied to SAMTA, were constitutional
because they did not destroy the state's sovereignty, violate any
constitutional provision, including the Tenth Amendment, or cause
any malfunction in the political process.139
C. South Carolina v. Baker
Although the legislation at issue in South Carolina v. Baker,'4°
section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
("TEFRA"), was not passed pursuant to Congress's Commerce
Clause powers, in its opinion the Court decided important issues
regarding the type of restrictions the Tenth Amendment imposes on
congressional regulation of the states as states.141 Section 310(b)(1) of
TEFRA required state, federal, and private corporate issuers of long-
term bonds to issue the bonds in registered form. Failure to comply
meant that interest earned on the bonds would not be exempt from
federal income tax. 42 The Court treated TEFRA as a law of general
applicability because it applied equally to the states and private
entities. 43  Although TEFRA did not explicitly prohibit the states
from issuing the non-tax-exempt bearer bonds, the Supreme Court, in
its Tenth Amendment analysis, treated section 310 as if it did.144
Challenging the constitutionality of TEFRA, South Carolina argued
that the statute violated the principles of federalism enunciated in
Garcia because an uninformed Congress chose an ineffective remedy,
and therefore the political process failed. 45  The Court, however,
characterized Garcia as holding "that the [Tenth Amendment] limits
are structural, not substantive-i.e., that States must find their
protection from congressional regulation through the national
political process. ' 146  The Baker Court acknowledged that some
"extraordinary defects" in the political process might trigger
138. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
139. See id. at 554-57.
140. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
141. See generally id. at 526-27 (addressing important issues of federalism).
142. See id. at 507-08.
143. See id. at 510.
144. See id. at 511.
145. See id. at 512; see also infra note 312 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of the political process in shielding the state from excessive federal
regulation that may impair the states from properly performing their role in the
federal system).
146. Baker, 485 U.S. at 512.
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substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions that would invalidate
congressional regulations of state activity, but failed to explain what
might constitute such a defect.47 The Court declined to invalidate
TEFRA on these grounds because "nothing in Garcia or the Tenth
Amendment authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis
for congressional legislation.""4 In essence, the Court held that the
political process does not fail when the federal government passes
legislation that the states feel is unwise. After finding that the
national political process did not fail in this case, the Baker Court
suggested that if a state could prove that it was politically alone and
isolated, the Court would seriously consider the possibility that a
failure in the political process had occurred. 49
After making the determination that section 310(b)(1) of TEFRA
did not violate the principles of federalism set forth in Garcia, the
Court addressed South Carolina's alternative argument: " that
section 310(b)(1) violates the Tenth Amendment because it
commandeers the legislative and administrative process of the state by
coercing the state to enact and administer a federal regulatory
program. 51  South Carolina argued that section 310(b)(1) did so
because the states, to continue issuing tax-exempt bonds, would have
to enact new laws to issue the bonds in registered form, and state
officials would have to invest a great deal of time and effort to
implement a registered bond system. 52 The Baker Court, however,
dismissed South Carolina's argument without deciding whether such
commandeering violated the Tenth Amendment, because the Court
determined that TEFRA did not force the states to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.'53 The Court ruled that
when the states make legislative and administrative changes in order
to comply with a federal statute, the states are not forced to
administer a federal regulatory program because such changes are "an
inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity."' ' Furthermore,
the Court stated that even though state administrative and legislative
147. See id
148. Id. at 513.
149. See id. at 512-13.
150. This Comment suggests that determining whether legislation that
commandeers the states by forcing states to legislate and enforce laws to regulate
third parties is not a separate inquiry from whether the principles of federalism as
enunciated in Garcia are violated. See infra Part V. This Comment argues that
federal legislation that commandeers the states to regulate third parties causes a
defect in the national political process because forcing the states to engage in
activities that only they can engage in ("uniquely sovereign activities") diminishes the
political accountability of both the federal and state governments and, therefore,
impairs the political process. See infra notes 306-18 and accompanying text.
151. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 513.
152- See id.at 514.
153. See id. at 514-15.
154. Id. at 514.
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action was necessary before South Carolina could continue engaging
in the regulated activity in compliance with federal regulations, this
type of "commandeering" is "a commonplace [result of regulation]
that presents no constitutional defect."' 55 Finally, the Court noted
that South Carolina's theory of commandeering would render Garcia
a nullity and restrict congressional regulation of state activities more
severely than did Usery because most federal statutes regulating the
states as states effectively force states to make such changes.'5 6
For these reasons, the Court held that section 310(b)(1) of TEFRA
did not commandeer the state legislative or administrative process
because it directly regulated state activity instead of "seek[ing] to
control or influence the manner in which [s]tates regulate private
parties."'57 The Baker Court, therefore, reserved for later judicial
determination the issue of whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits
Congress from forcing the states to regulate third parties on behalf of
the federal government.
D. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States, 58 the Supreme Court decided the
question left unresolved by Baker: whether the principles of
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress
from enacting legislation that forces state legislatures to enact or
administer federal regulatory programs. 159  The New York Court
considered whether provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act ("LRWP"), including the "take-title" provision, 160 were
unconstitutional because they overstepped the boundaries of federal
authority in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 6' The Court began
its opinion by noting that recent cases interpreting the Tenth
Amendment, such as Usery, Garcia, and Baker, were distinguishable
from New York because those cases involved laws of general
155. Id. at 515.
156. See id. at 515.
157. Id. at 514.
158. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
159. See id. at 188.
160. The take-title provision required states to either subsidize waste producers by
becoming owners of the waste, and therefore liable for resulting damages, or enact a
federal regulatory program. See id. at 175-77. The Court also evaluated two other
incentive provisions. The first set of incentives (1) authorized states with disposal
sites to collect a surcharge on waste transported from other states; (2) allowed the
Secretary of Energy to place a portion of those funds in an escrow account; and (3)
then granted funds from this account to states that achieved certain federally
mandated goals. See id. at 171-72. The second set of incentives authorized states with
waste disposal sites to raise the costs of disposal to out-of-state customers and,
eventually, prohibit out-of-state waste from being imported unless the waste-
exporting states met certain federal deadlines. See id. at 173-74.
161. See id. at 149-54.
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applicability.162 In contrast, the Court characterized the facts of New
York as concerning the circumstances "under which Congress may use
the States as implements of regulation."'" After making this
determination, the Court stated that although the power to directly
regulate waste disposal was within the ambit of Congress's Commerce
Clause authority, Congress did not have the power to force the states
to regulate interstate commerce. 6
The Court held that Congress violates the Tenth Amendment
when, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, it passes laws that
"commandeer" the state legislature by forcing a state to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program."~ According to the Court,
coercing states into enacting and administering federal regulatory
programs diminishes the political accountability of both the federal
and state governments.166  A decrease in political accountability
impedes the political process because it hinders the ability of citizens
to elect officials who share their views t67  Legislation that
"commandeers" state legislatures masks the true origin of the
regulation, and thus potentially shields the federal government from
responsibility for unpopular decisions.16" For example, if the New
York State legislature voluntarily enacted the provisions at issue,
citizens of New York who disagreed with that decision could vote the
incumbent legislators out of office and elect officials who share their
views.169  Alternatively, when the federal government passes
legislation that preempts state legislation, the citizens of New York
can direct their anger, and possibly votes, at federal officialsY" If,
however, the federal government can indirectly regulate private
entities by forcing the state legislatures to enact or administer
regulatory programs, the citizens will not know whether state or
federal officials devised the program and, therefore, political
accountability is diminished."'
After explaining the political accountability rationale upon which
its decision appears to rest, the Court considered whether the
provisions of the LRWP commandeered the state legislature in
162. See id at 160-61.
163. Id. at 161.
164. See id. at 188.
165. See id at 188 ("Whatever the outer limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one
thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.").
166. See id. at 168-69.
167. See id
168. See id The Court stated that political "[a]ccountability is.. .diminished when,
due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
views of the local electorate." Id. at 169.
169. See id at 168.




violation of the Tenth Amendment. 172 The Court determined that the
first two sets of incentives, which conditioned the receipt of federal
money on compliance with federal goals and authorized states with
waste disposal sites to discriminate in interstate commerce against
states that failed to comply with federal regulations, did not violate
the Tenth Amendment because the first was a valid exercise of
Congress's Spending Clause power and the second was a valid
exercise of conditional preemption. 73 The Court did hold, however,
that the "take-title" provision violated the Tenth Amendment
because the provision forced the state to choose between enacting a
federal regulatory program and being held financially responsible for
damages as owners of the waste. 74 The Court noted that the "take-
title" provision failed to provide the state with a critical alternative:
the "[s]tate may not decline to administer the federal program. No
matter which path the [s]tate chooses, it must follow the direction of
Congress."'75 By failing to provide the states with the choice not to
legislate, the federal government crossed "the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion.' 76
E. Printz v. United States
In Printz v. United States, 177 the Supreme Court followed and
extended its reasoning in New York by deciding that the Tenth
Amendment prohibited Congress from enforcing certain provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act"). The
contested provisions of the Brady Act required state chief law
enforcement officers ("CLEOs") to participate in the temporary
administration of a federal regulatory program by conducting
background checks and accepting handgun applicant statements.,78
172. See id. at 169.
173. The Court held that the first set of incentives did not violate the Tenth
Amendment because the Spending Clause granted Congress the power to condition
the distribution of funds on whether the states achieved certain goals. See id. at 171-
73. The Court also held that the second set of incentives offered states the choice of
either regulating an activity within Congress's Commerce Clause power "according to
federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation," an example
of conditional preemption that was already determined to be constitutional. Id. at
173-74; see Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi ("FERC"), 456 U.S.
742, 764-65 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264,288 (1981).
174. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-77. The Court noted that both of these
"choices" would commandeer the state to enact and administer a federal regulatory
program. See id. at 176-77.
175. Id. at 177.
176. Id. at 175; see also Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 459-60 (5th Cir. 1996)
("[T]he [s]tate has no walk-away opportunity, however costly or difficult, the IsItates
are victims of impermissible federal coercion.").
177. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
178. See id. at 902-04. Once the Attorney General completed the creation of a
national gun database, CLEOs would be relieved of their administrative task. See id.
2570 [Vol. 68
TENTH AMENDMENT JURISPR UDENCE
The petitioners in Printz challenged the constitutionality of the Brady
Act's interim registration provisions on the grounds that the
provisions conscripted state officers to enforce and administer a
federal regulatory program aimed at third parties.179
After 'discussing and accepting historical evidence demonstrating
that the Framers did not construe the Constitution as granting
Congress the power to force state officers to implement federal
regulatory programs, the Printz Court examined whether the "novel"
CLEO provisions of the Brady Act violated the Tenth Amendment."W
The Court first noted that the Framers designed the Constitution's
structure to protect the people from a potentially tyrannous federal
government by dividing power between the state and federal
governments.181 According to the Court, Congressional legislation
forcing state CLEOs to administer the Brady Act would upset this
balance because "[t]he power of the Federal Government would be
augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service-and
at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50 States.""s The CLEO
provisions of the Brady Act would also upset the balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government because the Constitution grants only the President the
authority to enforce Congressional legislation; thus, the Constitution
did not grant Congress the authority to indirectly enforce its
legislation by conscripting state executive officers.13 The Court also
emphasized that the Constitution granted Congress the authority to
regulate private entities, not states, to ensure that both the state and
federal governments remain responsive and politically accountable to
the people.' 84
After examining the structure of the Constitution, the Printz Court
analyzed the most "conclusive" evidence regarding the
constitutionality of the CLEO provisions of the Brady Act-the
recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment limitations on
Congressional power.1 5 The Court characterized these prior cases as
holding that "the Federal Government may not compel the States to
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs,"1 6 and noted that "this Court never has sanctioned
at 902.
179. See id. at 905.
180. See id. at 925-27.
181. See id. at 919-23. The "double security" system established by the structure of
the Constitution shields the people from excessive centralized authority because of
the balance of power existing between the federal and state governments, and the
establishment of the three branches of the federal government, which hold each other
in check. See id
182. Id at 922.
183. See id at 922-23.
184. See id at 919-20.




explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce
laws and regulations." 187 Finally, the Court rejected the United
States's argument that the CLEO provisions were constitutional
because they served important purposes and that state executive
officers were in a better position to administer the regulations."s The
Court noted that although these factors may be relevant "if we were
evaluating whether the incidental application to the States of a federal
law of general applicability" under the Garcia line of cases was
permissible, this balancing was inappropriate when "the whole object
of the law [is] to direct the functioning of the state executive, and
hence [to] compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty"
because "[i]t is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that
such a law offends .... "89
After discussing past decisions, the Court ruled that the CLEO
provisions of the Brady Act attempted to circumvent the holding in
New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or
administer federal regulatory programs. 190 The Court, therefore, held
that the CLEO provisions of the Brady Act were unconstitutional
because they forced state executive officials to enforce federal laws in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.19 According to the Court, "[t]he
Federal Government may [not] issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States' officers.., to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program .... [because]
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty."19
Although Congress's Commerce Clause powers are plenary, the
Tenth Amendment imposes substantive restrictions on the exercise of
that power. Recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the Tenth
Amendment prohibits Congress from regulating the states as states in
a manner that forces the states to utilize their sovereign power to
187. Id. at 926 (quoting Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi
("FERC"), 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982)).
188. See id. at 931-32.
189. Id. at 932 (emphasis in original).
190. See id. at 933.
191. See id. at 933-35.
192. Id. at 935. Because Printz was a 5-4 decision, the concurring opinions of
Justices O'Connor and Thomas may qualify the majority opinion, but that issue is
beyond the scope of this Comment. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court's
holding did not spell the end of the Brady Act's objectives because Congress could,
pursuant to its Spending Clause powers, condition the receipt of federal funds on
compliance with the CLEO provisions. See id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
O'Connor also noted that the Court refrained from deciding whether ministerial
reporting requirements imposed by Congress on the states pursuant to the Commerce
Clause powers were unconstitutional. See id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion emphasized that the Tenth Amendment affirms
the notion that "the federal government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers"




enact and administer federal regulatory programs, but allows
Congress to regulate the states as states when they engage in an
activity in which private entities also engage. Under this legal
framework, the Fourth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the
DPPA.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CONDON V. RENO
In Condon v. Reno," the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the
district court's opinion and held that the DPPA violated the Tenth
Amendment.1" In Condon, the Fourth Circuit noted that although
the Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate
entities engaged in interstate commerce, the Tenth Amendment
restricts the exercise of this power when it is directed at the states.19
The court then stated that Congress can constitutionally regulate the
states as states without violating the Tenth Amendment only through
the use of generally applicable laws. 196 In support of this conclusion,
the Fourth Circuit identified what it considered to be two distinct lines
of Supreme Court cases involving the Tenth Amendment limitations
on the exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause: the Garcia line and the New York line.11 The court
characterized the Garcia line of cases, a line including Wirtz, Usery,
193. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
194. See id. at 456-62; Recent Cases, supra note 56, at 1100-01; see also Hartzell-
Jordan, supra note 8, at 220-26 (noting that the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment and granted an
injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the Act in South Carolina). But see Travis
v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing the district court's decision
and holding that "whatever may be said about the Act's wisdom, it is within the
commerce power and compatible with the constitutional principles of federalism"),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000).
195. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
196. See id. at 461. But see Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v.
United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) (declaring that this holding made
by the Fourth Circuit was incorrect because "[tihe Supreme Court has never
suggested that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from regulating state conduct
merely because states are the only actors engaged in [the] activity"); Condon, 155
F.3d at 467-68 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (stating that the recent Supreme Court cases
providing the Tenth Amendment restrictions on Congress's exercise of its Commerce
Clause power have never even intimated that Congress may regulate the states in a
manner "consistent with the structural limitations of federalism" only through
generally applicable legislation); see also Hartzell-Jordan, supra note 8, at 227
(discussing how Judge Phillips's dissent in Condon took issue with the majority's
determination that only generally applicable laws pass constitutional muster).
197. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458; see also Lind & Eckart, supra note 8, at 19-20
(noting that there are two different lines of cases employed to determine whether
Commerce Clause legislation regulating the states as states violates the Tenth
Amendment: the Garcia line of cases and the New York and Printz line). But see infra
Part V (arguing that New York and Printz are not a separate and distinct line of cases,
but instead are examples of the substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions




and Baker, as a model of inconsistency that, in light of the New York
line, could be interpreted as merely standing for the proposition that
Congress can regulate state activities through laws of general
applicability.198 In contrast, the court characterized the New York line
of cases, which includes Printz, as a "model of consistency" that stood
for the proposition that Congress may not use the state governments
as implements of regulation.1 99
The Fourth Circuit noted that the DPPA was distinguishable from
the "take-title" provision in New York,2°° and the CLEO provisions of
the Brady Act in Printz,21 because the DPPA neither commandeered
the state legislative process nor conscripted state executive officers to
enforce a federal regulatory program targeting third parties12c
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the DPPA required state
officials to "administer" a federal regulatory program in violation of
the principles of federalism enunciated in New York and Printz
because the DMVs must change their operations at substantial cost in
order to comply with the DPPA.2 °3
The Fourth Circuit's holding rejected the United States's argument
that New York and Printz should not govern the instant case because
the DPPA, unlike the "take-title" and CLEO provisions, neither
directly regulates commercial activity in which the states engage, nor
forces the states to regulate the activity of third parties,20  and
therefore, the constitutionality of the DPPA should be determined
under the Garcia line of cases.05 Instead of rebutting this argument,
the court assumed, arguendo, that the federal government's "narrow"
reading of New York and Printz was correct. Despite this assumption,
the Fourth Circuit held, in the alternative, that the DPPA is
unconstitutional even under the Garcia line of cases because
198. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 459. The Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence before Garcia was also extremely erratic. See supra note 39.
199. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 459.
200. See supra notes 160-61, 174-76 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
202. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461; see also id. at 466 (Phillips, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that "[tihe [Condon] majority concedes, as it must, that the end object of
the Act is the direct regulation of state conduct. It is not the indirect regulation of
private conduct-here [personal] information use-by forcing the states directly to
regulate that conduct .... ").
203. See id. at 460; see also Kim, supra note 9, at 244-45 (reiterating that the
Condon court struck down the DPPA as violative of the principles of federalism
embodied in the Tenth Amendment).
204. In fact, the DPPA does not force the States to do anything at all. See infra
notes 323-25. Instead of complying with the DPPA, a state can choose to discontinue
the sale and dissemination of drivers' personal information. See infra note 323 and
accompanying text.
205. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-62 ("The United States attempts to sidestep this
problem, however, by contending that the holdings in Printz and New York apply




"Congress may only subject the States to legislation that is also
applicable to private parties."' ° After making this novel ruling, the
court determined that the DPPA was not generally applicable because
it targets the states in a unique way.2 7 The court also rejected the
United States's argument that the DPPA is constitutional even under
the Fourth Circuit's narrow reading of the Garcia line because the
DPPA subjects the DMVs to a similar type of regulation to which the
government subjects private entities and, therefore, is generally
applicable.2 °" The court re-emphasized that Congress can never
regulate the activity of the states as states subject to one exception:
when the law is truly generally applicable.2
Thus, the Fourth Circuit based its decision that the DPPA violates
the Tenth Amendment on two major holdings: (1) The DPPA forces
state officers to "administer" a federal regulatory program in violation
of the Tenth Amendment because the DMVs must change the way
they operate and retrain employees at considerable expense-z21 and (2)
Congress may regulate the commercial activity of the states only
through the use of generally applicable laws, which constitutes the one
and only exception to a general prohibition against the federal
government's direct regulation of the states.21' Subsequently, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Condon to settle the question of
whether the DPPA violated the Tenth Amendment. The next part
discusses the reasoning utilized by the Supreme Court to reverse the
Fourth Circuit and uphold the DPPA as valid Commerce Clause
legislation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RENO V. CONDON
On January 12, 2000, the Supreme Court in Reno reversed the
Fourth Circuit's decision and issued a unanimous opinion holding that
the DPPA is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers and does not violate the principles of federalism embodied in
the Tenth Amendment.12 Chief Justice Rehnquist's brief opinion for
the unanimous Court began by incontrovertibly stating that the DPPA
does not violate the principles of federalism delineated in New York
206. Id. at 461. But see Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1998)
(intimating that the DPPA is generally applicable because similar private activity, the
sale and dissemination of personal information, is regulated by other statutes), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000).
207. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-62.
208. See id at 462-63. For example, the federal government regulates the extent to
which video stores and cable companies may disclose the information they have
collected. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2000); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1994).
209. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 462.
210. See id. at 460.
211. See id at 461-63.
212. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666,668, 671-72 (2000).
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and Printz.21" After examining the DPPA's provisions, such as the
mandatory and discretionary disclosure provisions, the regulations on
redisclosure, the opt-in requirement, and the penalties for violating
the various provisions,21 4 the Court made a critical factual
determination about the DPPA.2 15 The Court stated that the law was
one of general applicability because it does not apply solely to the
states in that it also regulates the resale and redisclosure of drivers'
personal information by private entities that obtained the information
from a state DMV.216 The Court noted that the DPPA is generally
applicable because the statute "regulates the universe of entities that
participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information-
the States as initial suppliers of the information ... and private
resellers or redisclosers of that information." ' 7
In accord with the United States's argument,2 18 the Court held that,
in this context, the personal information disseminated by DMVs is "a
'thin[g] in interstate commerce' 219 because this information is used by
a myriad of people engaged in interstate commerce 2 0 and is "used in
the stream of interstate commerce by various.., entities for matters
related to interstate motoring." '  Because the Court held that
drivers' personal information is an article in interstate commerce, it
was unnecessary for the Court to rule on whether the intrastate
activities of the DMVs had a "sufficiently substantial impact on
interstate commerce" to justify Congress's use of its Commerce
Clause powers. 2
After holding that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the
authority to regulate the sale and dissemination of drivers' personal
information, the Court turned to the question of whether the Tenth
213. See id. at 668. For a detailed discussion of the principles of federalism
enunciated in New York and Printz, see supra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part I (providing a more thorough examination of the DPPA).
215. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 669.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 672. The Court's crucial determination that the DPPA is generally
applicable made it unnecessary for the Court to decide how to reconcile Garcia and
its progeny with New York and Printz. See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
218. See Brief for Petitioners at 23, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (No. 98-
1464), available in 1999 WL 513843 (advocating that personal information disclosed
by State DMVs is "legitimately subject to congressional regulation because the States
place the private information in[] commerce, and because dissemination of the
information is an activity 'having a substantial relation to interstate commerce'
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995))); see also supra notes
91-98 and accompanying text (explaining Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
219. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558
(1995) (alteration in original)).
220. See id. ("[M]otor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is
used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate
commerce .....
221. Id.
222. Id.; supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (describing in more detail
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce).
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Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating this personal
information in the manner prescribed by the DPPA. The Court first
addressed the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the DPPA violated the
principles of federalism enunciated in New York and Printz.2 The
Fourth Circuit had held that the DPPA violated the Tenth
Amendment because it effectively requires the DMV to re-train
employees and make other changes at a substantial cost, and therefore
forces the states to administer a federal regulatory program.2 In
Reno, the Court reaffirmed that New York and Printz impose
substantive Tenth Amendment limitations on Congress's exercise of
its Commerce Clause powers.' The Reno Court then interpreted its
decision in New York as holding that the Constitution does not grant
Congress the power "to [ ] require the States to govern according to
Congress' instructions,"'" and interpreted Printz as holding "that
Congress cannot circumvent... [New York's] prohibition by
conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government
may neither... [require] the states to address particular problems,
nor command the States' officers... to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program."' After characterizing the principles of
federalism enunciated in New York and Printz in this manner, the
Court analyzed whether the DPPA violated the principles set forth in
those cases.229
The Court agreed that the DPPA would impose a burden on
DMVs, but rejected South Carolina's argument that the DPPA
violates the prohibitions of New York and Printz.1" But instead of
relying on New York and Printz to reach its conclusion, the Court
determined "that this case is governed by our decision in South
223. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
224. See id- at 671-72.
225. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
226. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72.
227. Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)).
228. Id. at 671 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)).
229. See id. at 671-72.
230. See id. at 672. South Carolina stated that the DPPA places an enormous
burden on the states because they must administer complicated provisions on a daily
basis. See Brief for Respondents at 10, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (No. 98-
1464), available in 1999 WL 688428 (noting that "[t]he DPPA thrusts upon the States
all of the day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex provisions"). South
Carolina also complained that the DPPA requires the states to shoulder an economic
burden that would drain financial resources. See id. at 16-17 (arguing that the DPPA
allows the federal government to receive credit for solving a problem even though the
states, not the federal government, would "incur the financial... burdens of
administering the statute"). South Carolina also noted that the DPPA's provisions
threaten the states with penalties if they fail to comply with the regulations. See id. at
6 (asserting that the DPPA "creates potentially severe federal penalties for erroneous
decisions by state officials"). For all of these reasons, South Carolina vehemently
argued that the DPPA forces the states to administer a federal regulatory program in
violation of New York and Printz. See id. at 15.
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Carolina v. Baker .... ,1 The Court explained that the Baker Court
upheld the challenged legislation because it "regulate[d] state
activities" instead of "seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in
which States regulate private parties."232 In addition, the Reno Court
recognized that in Baker, the state, as in the instant case, argued that
the federal government "commandeered the state legislative and
administrative process... because state officials had to devote
substantial effort to determine how best to implement [the provisions
of the statute]." 33 The Reno Court noted that Baker concluded that
"[s]uch 'commandeering' is... an inevitable consequence of
regulating a state activity,"'  and laws that require a state to take
certain administrative actions to comply with federal regulations as a
prerequisite to engaging in such activity present no constitutional
defect.2 35
Without clearly explaining why Baker provided the proper
precedent for evaluating the constitutionality of the DPPA rather
than New York and Printz, the Court distinguished the DPPA and the
statute challenged in Baker by noting that neither "require[d] the
States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. 236
Thus, because the DPPA regulates the "States as the owner of
databases[,] [i]t does not require... [the State legislatures to legislate]
and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal statutes regulating private individuals. ' 37  Although this
language, when viewed in light of the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Travis v. Reno," suggests the possibility of a market participator
231. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672 (citations omitted).
232. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)); supra notes
140-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Baker)
233. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672 (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
234. Id. (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
235. See id. at 672 (citing Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
236. Id. at 672.
237. Id.
238. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000). Judge
Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit stated that "the basic distinction
between cases such as [Baker] and cases such as New York [and Printzl is that states
and private parties may be the objects of [commercial] regulation, although states
cannot be compelled to become regulators of private conduct." Id. at 1004 (stating
that the DPPA "affects states as owners of databases; it does not affect them in their
role as governments") (emphasis in original). Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the
court also stated that many federal laws regulate the commercial activity of the states
as states and that the "anticommandeering rule comes into play only when the federal
government calls on the states to use their sovereign powers as regulators of their
citizens." Id. at 1004-05. For these reasons, the court concluded that the DPPA "does
not commandeer [the] states in violation of the [Tenth Amendment]," because the
DPPA "affects states as owners of data, rather than as sovereigns .. " Id at 1005; cf
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-37 (1980) (holding that states, when acting as
market participants, can discriminate against the citizens of other states in interstate
commerce without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979) (holding that the states, when acting in their sovereign
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versus citizen regulator distinction in the Court's Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court did not explicitly so hold." 9
Because the Reno Court determined that the DPPA was a law of
general applicability,' it refrained from deciding whether the Fourth
Circuit incorrectly held that Congress may regulate the states as states
pursuant to the Commerce Clause powers only through laws of
general applicability. 241 Thus, the Reno Court left for later judicial
determination the question of whether general applicability is a
constitutional prerequisite for federal regulation targeting the states
as states.242 The next part analyzes the soundness of the Reno Court's
decision in light of recent Supreme Court Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RENO v.
CONDON
This part argues that the Reno Court was correct in reversing the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Condon. The Reno Court, however, did
not provide a coherent rationale for its decision. This Comment
argues that the Court missed an opportunity to stabilize its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence by failing to recognize: that New York and
Printz are not separate and distinct from the Garcia line of cases; the
importance of the underlying activity being regulated; and the pivotal
role state choice plays in the Court's Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's decision in Reno correctly reversed the
Fourth Circuit and held that the DPPA is a valid exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers that does not violate the
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment.4
Specifically, the Court held that the DPPA regulates an article in
interstate commerce: drivers' personal information contained in DMV
databases that is then sold and disseminated. 2" The Reno Court
capacity as market regulators, violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if they regulate
interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner).
239. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
240. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
241. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 668.
244. See id. at 671. The Supreme Court in Reno exercised caution in deciding that
the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to pass the DPPA, as evidenced by
its holding that, in this context, drivers' personal information is an article in interstate
commerce. See id. The caution exercised by the Supreme Court is contrasted by the
lower courts' unequivocal determination that the Commerce Clause clearly grants
Congress the power to regulate the sale and dissemination of drivers' personal
information. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States,
161 F.3d 1266, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000); Travis v.
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000); see also
Pryor v. Reno, 171 F3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[lit is abundantly clear that
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determined that the Tenth Amendment does not invalidate
legislation, such as the DPPA, that regulates the commercial activity
in which the states as states engage, even though such regulation
forces the states to implement costly changes in the way they currently
operate. 45 The Reno Court, however, refrained from deciding
whether the Fourth Circuit incorrectly determined that general
applicability is a constitutional requirement for congressional
Commerce Clause legislation that regulates the states as states.246
The Reno Court correctly decided the case but did not clearly
provide a rationale for its decision.247 Although some language in the
Court's opinion, 4 8 when viewed in light of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Travis,2 9 suggests that the Supreme Court may consider
adopting a market participant versus citizen regulator distinction, the
Court did not explicitly make that holding.10 In addition, the Court
avoided the difficult question of how to reconcile Garcia, Baker, New
York, and Printz by torturing the accepted definition of what type of
legislation is generally applicable in order to encompass the DPPA's
provisions 1  The Court did this by holding that the DPPA was
generally applicable even though states are affected differently than
private entities that redisclose drivers' personal information2 52
The Reno Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision because the
Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the DPPA
violated the substantive Tenth Amendment limitations on Congress's
Commerce Clause power.32 This reversal was justified because the
Fourth Circuit based its conclusion that the DPPA was
unconstitutional on two erroneous holdings resulting from a
misinterpretation of the Supreme Court cases that provide, and
explain, the constitutional restrictions that the principles of federalism
trafficking in databases is an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce
these days."), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000).
245. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 668, 671-72; supra notes 223-37 and accompanying text.
246. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000); supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 326-
31.
247. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72.
248. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672. The market participant versus citizen regulator
distinction apparently adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Travis, correctly recognizes
that the nature of the state activity being regulated, commercial activity or sovereign
activity, is crucial in determining whether Commerce Clause legislation violates the
Tenth Amendment. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000); supra note 238 and accompanying text. This distinction
is too narrow a test for determining whether legislation violates the Tenth
Amendment because it would not protect all "uniquely sovereign activities," does not
mesh well with past precedent such as Garcia, and may further complicate an already
confused area of the law. See infra text accompanying notes 316-18.
251. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
252. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672; supra notes 8, 216-17 and accompanying text.
253. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672; supra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
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impose on Congressional Commerce Clause legislation.'
The Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly
ruled that the DPPA violated the principles of federalism enunciated
in New York and Printz.25? The Fourth Circuit failed to identify
correctly the critical differences between the DPPA and the
legislation invalidated in those cases. The unconstitutional provision
in New York, the "take-title" provision, attempted to force New York
State to enact legislation regulating third parties. - Similarly, in
Printz, the unconstitutional CLEO provisions of the Brady Act
attempted to force state executive officers to administer and enforce
laws aimed at third parties-5 Only sovereigns can enact and
administer laws directed at third parties. In those contexts, the
Supreme Court has held that Congressional legislation that forces
state executive or legislative officials to enforce or administer federal
regulatory programs diminishes the political accountability-5s of both
the federal and state governments and violates the principles of
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment. 9
In contrast to the provisions invalidated in New York and Printz,
the DPPA directly regulates the commercial activity in which the
states as states voluntarily engage.m Although the DPPA principally
regulates the way state DMVs sell and disseminate drivers' personal
information contained in their databases,. 1 many private entities sell
personal information and are regulated by the federal government
254. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
255. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672; supra note 230.
256. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1992).
257. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); supra notes 177-79 and
accompanying text.
258. Although the Condon court did not conclude that the DPPA diminished
political accountability, the Eleventh Circuit did. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281,
1287-88 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000). The Eleventh Circuit
determined that the DPPA diminishes political accountability because state officials
will bear the financial cost of administering the program and will be blamed by the
public if the program is unpopular because their officers will administer the program
on a daily basis. See id at 1287-88. The Eleventh Circuit, however, failed to consider
that unlike the legislation invalidated in New York and Printz, the DPPA gave the
states the choice of whether to "administer" the federal regulatory program. See infra
notes 320-25 and accompanying text. The DPPA imposes regulatory burdens only on
those states that choose to sell and disseminate drivers' personal information, and
therefore, political accountability is not diminished because the states are simply
bearing the responsibility for making the decision to engage in this type of
commercial activity. See infra notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
260. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161
F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) ("If states do not wish to comply with [the DPPA's]
regulations, they may stop disseminating information in their motor vehicle records to
the public. In contrast, the statute in New York offered no such alternative to the
states."), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998) (regulating the sale and dissemination of drivers' personal
information).
261. See supra note 8.
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through other statutes.262  The DPPA does not force the states to
engage in the sale and dissemination of drivers' personal
information;263 the DPPA merely requires compliance with certain
federal standards as a condition to engaging in this form of
commercial activity.264  Consequently, the legislative branch of the
federal government enacted the DPPA, and the executive branch of
the federal government shoulders the burden of enforcing the DPPA's
provisions.2
65
Despite Congress's enactment of a law that regulates the
commercial activity in which the states as states choose to engage, the
Fourth Circuit held that the DPPA forces the States to "administer" a
federal regulatory program in violation of the Tenth Amendment
restrictions set forth in New York and Printz.266 This reasoning,
however, ignored the Supreme Court's holding in Baker. The Baker
Court explicitly ruled that the states are not commandeered into
administering federal regulatory programs even though they must
implement a variety of costly administrative and legislative changes to
continue engaging in the activity in conformity with the federal
legislation.2 67 According to the Baker Court, "[s]uch 'commandeering'
is... an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity."' " The
Fourth Circuit, however, attempted to avoid the precedential force of
Baker by holding, in the alternative, that the principles of federalism
enunciated in Garcia, when viewed in light of Printz and New York,
generally prohibit Congress from regulating the commercial activity of
the states as states unless Congress enacts a law of general
applicability.2169
In Reno, the Court held that the DPPA does not force the states to
262. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that an
important factor in determining whether legislation is generally applicable is the
extent to which the same activity is being engaged in by private entities that are
regulated in separate statutes), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000); supra notes 8, 208.
263. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
264. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000).
265. See id. at 460; Brief for Petitioners at 27, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000) (No. 98-1464), available in 1999 WL 513843.
266. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460-61; supra note 203 and accompanying text.
Despite the fact that the New York and Printz Courts invalidated the federal
regulations on Tenth Amendment grounds based on a political accountability
rationale, the Condon court did not even attempt to justify its decision based on this
rationale. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460-61 (declining to rely on, or mention, the
political accountability rationale to justify invalidating the DPPA on substantive
Tenth Amendment grounds). But see Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1287-88 (1 1th Cir.
1998) (holding that the DPPA violates the substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions
enunciated in New York and Printz because it diminishes political accountability),
vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000).
267. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988); supra notes 154-55
and accompanying text.
268. Baker, 485 U.S. at 514.
269. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-63; supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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administer a federal regulatory program in violation of the substantive
Tenth Amendment limitations on Congress's Commerce Clause
powers.270 Rather than rely on New York and Printz to determine the
constitutionality of the DPPA, the Court relied upon its earlier
holding in Baker.2 ' The Court also noted that the DPPA, like the
provisions challenged in Baker, did not force the states to regulate
their citizens through the use of the states' sovereign powers.' The
Court emphasized that the DPPA does not force the state legislatures
to legislate, or force executive officers to enforce federal laws; instead
"[t]he DPPA regulates the [s]tates as... owners of databases."'
Although the Court ruled that the Condon court incorrectly relied on
New York and Printz rather than Baker,274 the Court did not provide a
rationale explaining why the substantive Tenth Amendment
limitations enunciated in New York and Printz do not apply to
legislation such as the DPPA.275
Although the Reno Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's
determination that the DPPA is unconstitutional, it refrained from
addressing the Fourth Circuit's alternative holding that Congress can
regulate the commercial activity of the states as states only through
the use of generally applicable laws.276  According to the Fourth
Circuit, the Garcia line of cases, as modified by New York and Printz,
stands for the proposition that generally applicable laws are the one
exception to a general prohibition against the federal government
regulating the commercial activity engaged in by the states as statespm
270. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 668, 671-72 (2000); supra notes 229-30 and
accompanying text.
271. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. See id.; supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
275. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672. Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh
Circuit used similar language to hold that the principles of federalism enunciated in
New York and Printz did not apply to the DPPA based on what appeared to be a
market participant versus citizen regulator distinction. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d
1000, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000); supra note 238 and
accompanying text. Although the Reno Court utilized similar language, the Court did
not appear to adopt a citizen regulator versus market participant distinction. See
Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72. The Reno Court, therefore, did not explicitly provide a
rationale for its decision. See id.
276. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672; see also text accompanying notes 240.42
(describing how the Reno Court analyzed this portion of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion).
277. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 461-63 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000); supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text. In Condon, the court also held
that the fact that Congress regulates the same activity of private entities in different
statutes "is irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment [analysis]." Condon, 155 F.3d at 462.
According to the Fourth Circuit, federal regulation of commercial activity engaged in
by the States as States and private parties must be contained in one piece of
legislation or the legislation is unconstitutional. See id. This holding is puzzling
because it means that legislation is constitutional if it regulates a similar activity
engaged in by states and private entities in the same statute, but unconstitutional if it
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The Fourth Circuit's alternative holding, however, is a radical
departure from Supreme Court precedent. 7
In Garcia, the Supreme Court held that, in general, Congress can
regulate the activity that the states as states engage in without
violating the Tenth Amendment because the states' role in the federal
system is protected principally by the national political process.
According to Garcia, the states' position in the federal system is not
generally protected by the Court's imposition of substantive Tenth
Amendment restrictions that insulate state activity from regulation in
certain areas.279  Thus, according to the Garcia Court, the Tenth
Amendment limitations on Congressional legislation targeting the
activities of the states as states are principally structural, not
substantive.80
The Fourth Circuit's alternative holding in Condon emasculates
Garcia"' because under that ruling the Tenth Amendment would
generally insulate from federal regulation every commercial activity in
which the states as states engage.m The one exception to this
prohibition would allow Congress to regulate the commercial activity
of the states through generally applicable laws. 83 This mechanical test
to determine the constitutionality of Congressional legislation that
directly regulates the states' activity is even more restrictive than the
"traditional governmental functions" test set forth in the now
overruled Usery case,' and conflicts with the principles of federalism
regulates only the states, even if every other private entity engaging in the same
activity is regulated through a separate statute and, therefore, the constitutionality of
legislation would have nothing to do with the activity regulated. But see Travis, 163
F.3d at 1005-06 (determining that the existence of other statutes regulating private
entities that engage in the same activity is an important factor to be considered when
determining whether the law is generally applicable). The Supreme Court, however,
held that the DPPA was generally applicable because it regulated the "universe of
entities" engaged in the sale and distribution of drivers' personal information, not
because other statutes regulated similar private activity. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 668,
672.
278. See infra notes 281-314 and accompanying text.
279. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985);
supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
280. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988); Garcia, 469 U.S. at
547-55; see also Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-
Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1657, 1660-65 (1987) (noting that the
Tenth Amendment principles of federalism enunciated in Garcia require judicial
abstention from invalidating Congressional Commerce Clause legislation unless such
judicial intervention is necessary to remedy a defect in the national political process).
281. Although the Fourth Circuit's extremely narrow reading of Garcia, in light of
New York and Printz, casts doubt on Garcia's vitality, in 1999 four Supreme Court
justices signed an opinion stating that "Garcia remains good law, its reasoning has not
been repudiated ... " Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2292 (1999) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
28Z See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-63.
283. See id.
284. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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enunciated in Garcia.' The Fourth Circuit, however, reasoned that
its conclusion was correct because the New York and Printz Courts
declined to apply the principles of federalism enunciated in the Garcia
line of cases to legislation that was not generally applicable.""
The Reno Court refrained from deciding whether Congressional
Commerce Clause legislation regulating the states as states must be
generally applicable to pass constitutional muster under the Tenth
Amendment because the Court determined that the DPPA is
generally applicable. Even though the DPPA affects the states and
private entities that redisclose drivers' personal information
differently, the Court determined that the DPPA was generally
applicable because it regulates the "universe of entities" that
participate in the sale and dissemination of drivers' personal
information? 9 In addition, the Court apparently did not base its
holding that the DPPA was generally applicable on the fact that the
federal government also regulates the sale and dissemination of
personal information by private entities via other statutes.- This
conclusion seems questionable, especially in light of the fact that
certain provisions of the Brady Act and the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Act also regulated private parties in a different
manner than the states. Even the United States's brief, which
relegated the argument that the DPPA is generally applicable to a
footnote, suggests that the government thought it unlikely that the
Act would be considered generally applicable.-'9 By stretching the
accepted definition of generally applicable legislation to include the
DPPA, the Reno Court avoided having to reconcile the Garcia line
285. The mechanical "traditional governmental functions" test enunciated in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,850-55 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), insulated certain areas of
state activity from federal regulation without regard to the nature of the underlying
activity being insulated. The Fourth Circuit's strict general applicability test is an
even more restrictive mechanical test than the "traditional governmental functions"
test, and would greatly expand the restrictions that the Tenth Amendment imposes on
Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause powers.
286. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
287. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000): supra notes 214-17 and
accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
289. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
290. See generally id. (declining to hold that, although the DPPA regulates the
States in a unique way, it is generally applicable because private entities engaged in
similar activity are regulated in separate statutes). In doing so, the Reno Court chose
not to follow the Seventh Circuit's lead and focus on the fact that private entities
engaging in the same activity are regulated in other statutes. See Travis v. Reno, 163
F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000).
291. See Brief for Petitioners at 34 n.15, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (No.
98-1464), available in 1999 WL 513843. In this footnote, the United States argued that
"it is questionable whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that the DPPA is
not generally applicable." Id.
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with New York and Printz.29
The Reno Court should have held that Congressional Commerce
Clause legislation does not have to be generally applicable to pass
constitutional muster under the Tenth Amendment because the
Fourth Circuit made a fundamental error by interpreting the Garcia
line, in light of New York and Printz, so narrowly. By placing such
importance on the generally applicable nature of the challenged
legislation, the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the recent Supreme
Court cases that set forth the Tenth Amendment restrictions on
Congress's Commerce Clause powers. 93
The principles of federalism enunciated in Garcia provide that the
federal system is protected principally by the states' role in the
national political process.2 94  The Garcia Court, however,
acknowledged the possibility that a defect in the national political
process could trigger judicial enforcement of substantive Tenth
Amendment restrictions.295 Although most commentators and courts
view Garcia as embracing total judicial abdication from utilizing the
power of judicial review to invalidate legislation on Tenth
Amendment grounds, 96 a few commentators, and the Baker Court,
have recognized that Garcia could allow substantive Tenth
Amendment restrictions to remedy extraordinary defects in the
national political process.297
292. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
293. The Garcia Court held that, in general, Congress can regulate the states as
states under the Commerce Clause unless a defect in the national political process
occurs, because the role of the states is protected principally by the structure of the
national government, and not by judicially defined spheres of unregulable state
activity. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-53 (1985).
Although in New York and Printz, the Supreme Court noted that Garcia did not
apply because the challenged legislation at hand was not generally applicable, the
Court held that Congress cannot commandeer the state legislatures or conscript state
executive officials to enact or administer federal regulatory programs because this
type of legislation diminishes political accountability. See Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 919-21 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992). The
Court in New York and Printz, therefore, did not invalidate the legislation based on
the generally applicable nature of the legislation, they merely tried to avoid the
precedential weight of Garcia. See supra notes 162-64, 189 and accompanying text; see
also Hartzell-Jordan. supra note 8, at 247 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's holding).
294. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
295. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57.
296. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2292 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Garcia court "held that whatever protection the Constitution
afforded to the States' sovereignty lay in the constitutional structure, not in some
substantive guarantee").
297. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988) (deciding whether
the challenged legislation violated the principles of federalism enunciated in Garcia
by determining if the legislation caused an extraordinary defect in the national
political process); Odom, supra note 280, at 1660-65 (stating that Garcia allows for
Tenth Amendment restrictions on Congress's exercise of its enumerated powers). But
see Redish, supra note 12, at 42 (stating that while "it is true.., that the Court in
Garcia implied that it will intervene if there is a breakdown in the [political]
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In Baker, the Court faced the question of whether the principles of
federalism enunciated in Garcia prohibited Congress from enacting
TEFRA.2 98 South Carolina argued that Garcia invalidated this
legislation because TEFRA caused a defect in the national political
process.99 According to South Carolina, the political process failed
because an uninformed Congress passed ineffective legislation.-" The
Baker Court, however, rejected South Carolina's arguments and held
that Congress's unwise legislative choices do not constitute
extraordinary defects in the political process because neither Garcia
nor the Tenth Amendment allowed the courts to second-guess the
choices made by a democratically elected Congress."' Although the
Baker Court noted that Garcia did not identify or define what defects
would trigger the imposition of substantive Tenth Amendment
limitations, the Court suggested that a defect in the national political
process may have existed if South Carolina was left politically alone
and isolated.m2 The Baker Court left for later judicial determination
"another issue": 3  whether legislation that commandeers the
legislative and executive branches of the state government to regulate
third parties violates the Tenth Amendment.:'
In New York, the Court had occasion to decide the issue left
unresolved by Baker. The New York Court determined that this type
process] .... ," it is unlikely that the "Court's standard, to the extent that it was
designed to represent anything other than total abandonment of... state protection,
would be workable"); Mishkin, supra note 39, at 157 (noting that the necessity for
some judicially enforced Tenth Amendment restrictions "argues for overruling
Garcia-or, at very least, enlarging enormously upon the tiny 'process' opening left
by the majority opinion"). The general consensus is that "Garcia was read to mean
there would be no judicial enforcement against Congress of the law of federalism."
Jackson, supra note 105, at 2224. This Comment recognizes that the opening for
substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions under Garcia is currently extremely
narrow when vieved in light of Baker, but argues that the Supreme Court should
reconceptualize its decisions in Garcia, Baker, Newo York, and Printz to enlarge the
"extraordinary defect" opening to encompass legislation that diminishes political
accountability. See infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
298. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 508; supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
299. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 511-13.
300. See i at 512-13.
301. See id
302. See id. at 513. Although the Court's example seemed to suggest that Garcia
left an extremely narrow opening for substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions, in
the text preceding this example the Court noted that it was not "attempt[ing] any
definitive articulation [of the opening] here." Id. at 512.
303. This Comment argues that this inquiry was not another issue at all. In fact,
this Comment argues that the Court should consider diminished political
accountability to be an extraordinary defect in the political process that triggers
substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions under Garcia. See infra text accompanying
notes 310-16.
304. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 513. When the Court finally addressed the merits of
this argument in New York, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits
Congress from commandeering the state legislature because this diminishes the
political accountability of the state and federal governments. See supra notes 165-72.
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of legislation violated the Tenth Amendment based on a political
accountability rationale, not a mechanical determination that the
legislation was not generally applicable. 05 The New York Court
avoided the precedential force of the Garcia line by distinguishing
those cases as addressing Congress's authority to subject the states to
laws of general applicability. The New York Court, however, held the
"take-title" provision unconstitutional because it diminished political
accountability by allowing Congress to indirectly regulate third parties
by forcing the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate in a
particular field or a particular way.3°6 The holding in New York,
therefore, was based on a political accountability rationale, not a
mechanical determination that the law was not generally applicable.3"
Similarly, in Printz, the Court noted that revisiting the Garcia line
of cases was unnecessary because the CLEO provisions of the Brady
Act were not generally applicable.3 ' But the Court's inquiry did not
end there. The Printz Court went on to hold that the CLEO
provisions violated the Tenth Amendment because forcing state
executive officers to enforce federal regulatory programs circumvents
the holding in New York, thereby diminishing political
accountability.3"9
Both New York and Printz demonstrate that Congressional
Commerce Clause legislation violates the Tenth Amendment when
the legislation causes diminished political accountability.30 A lack of
political accountability impairs the proper functioning of the national
political process because, as noted in New York, citizens will be
unable to determine whether state or federal officials should be held
responsible for enacting legislation.31 ' If the citizens cannot easily
discern which level of government enacted legislation, the democratic
political process is compromised.312 Furthermore, even though the
305. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69, 188 (1992).
306. See id. at 159-61; supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
307. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69; supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
The New York court stressed that laws that force the states to enact and administer
federal regulatory programs allow Congress to indirectly regulate in a manner that
would prevent the people from knowing which officials enacted the program and,
therefore, diminishes political accountability of federal and state governmental
officials. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
308. In Printz, the Clourt noted that a balancing test taking into account factors
such as the burden the Brady Act would place on the states, may be appropriate when
evaluating a law of general applicability but not when "the whole object of the law [is]
to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the
structural framework of dual sovereignty." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-
33 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
309. See id. at 934-35.
310. See supra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
311. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
312. See id. The political accountability rationale argues that a number of
undesirable results can occur if the federal government commandeers the states,
including: (1) state officials being wrongly voted out of office; (2) federal officials not
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Courts in New York and Printz distinguished the Garcia line because
of the generally applicable nature of the challenged legislation, those
Courts determined the constitutionality of the legislation based on
whether the provisions diminished political accountability 31 The
Reno Court should have clearly stated that the DPPA did not violate
the substantive Tenth Amendment limitations enunciated in New
York and Printz because the DPPA did not diminish political
accountability. 314
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should stabilize its
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence by adopting a reconceptualization
of Garcia, Baker, New York, and Printz. As a first step, the Reno
Court should have provided a rationale for its decision by holding that
a careful analysis of Garcia, Baker, New York, and Printz
demonstrates that these cases are not two separate and distinct lines
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, but one line of cases following
Garcia. New York and Printz are examples of the substantive Tenth
Amendment restraints enunciated in Garcia that are necessary to
compensate for failings in the political process. The New York and
Printz Courts decided the constitutionality of the particular legislation
by determining whether the law regulates in a manner that diminishes
the political accountability of state and federal officials by forcing the
states to engage in the most basic sovereign activities, such as enacting
legislation to regulate third parties, and enforcing and administering
laws against third parties." 5  New York and Printz, therefore,
demonstrate that federal legislation that forces the states to engage in
"uniquely sovereign activities" leads to diminished political
accountability. 316 Forcing the states to engage in a uniquely sovereign
being held accountable for their decisions; and (3) federal legislators themselves not
feeling as accountable to the electorate because they can indirectly regulate through
the state government. See Jackson, supra note 105, at 2201. The Constitution requires
that both the state and federal governments remain politically accountable to the
people. See id; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (recognizing that political accountability is necessary for the federal
system to provide its citizens with more liberty than a unitary system); FTC v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) ("Federalism serves to assign political
responsibility, not to obscure it."). Citizens must know whether state or federal
officials should be held politically accountable for a given action in order for the
federal system to perform properly. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The concern about legislation that diminishes political accountability "is
grounded in legitimate considerations of constitutional history and structure."
Jackson, supra note 105, at 2200.
313. See supra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
315. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at
168-69,188.
316. See supra notes 158-92 and accompanying text; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (stating that legislation determining the qualification of state
judges "goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of
the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity"). It is clear that -[t]hrough the
structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government
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activity leads to a defect in the national political process because
citizens may blame state officials who had no choice but to engage in
the federal program instead of the federal officials who passed the
legislation; and in addition the states will be forced to pay for federal
regulatory programs for which Congress may get credit." 7 In contrast,
when the federal government simply regulates commercial activity in
which the states as states choose to engage, political accountability is
not diminished because the states can avoid the political consequences
by choosing not to engage in the commercial activity. Choice plays a
crucial role in the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.3 8
Failing to recognize the critical distinction between encouragement
and coercion would "plunge the law into endless difficulties..." by
accepting the fallacy that choice is impossible.3 9 Congress cannot
force the states to enact or administer federal regulatory programs
because the "touchstone of this impermissible coercion is whether the
States are precluded from rejecting the role envisioned for them by
the federal government. '32° The ability to choose not to follow a
federal regulatory program that calls for the states to enact or
administer such a program is a critical choice the states must be given
under the Tenth Amendment.32 ' Although the federal government
must give the states a choice as to whether or not to engage in
uniquely sovereign activities, the choice imposed by the federal
government can be an extremely difficult one.322
The Reno Court, therefore, should have focused on the fact that the
DPPA does not impermissibly coerce the states by forcing them to
authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign." Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
317. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
318. It is settled that "the law has been guided by a robust common sense which
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its
problems." Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
319. Id. at 590.
320. Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1996).
321. See id.; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 177 (stating that legislation that
commandeers the state legislature fails to give the states a critical alternative-the
choice not to engage in the sovereign activity of administering a regulatory program
against third parties); Acorn v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the challenged legislation violates the Tenth Amendment because the states were
deprived of the choice to refrain from enacting or administering the federal
regulatory program); United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195,
1205 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that legislation is not invalid under the Tenth
Amendment if "it leaves the states free to make choices which are essential to their
functions as states").
322. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi ("FERC"), 456 U.S.
742, 766 (1982); see also Koog, 79 F.3d at 459-60 (holding that if "the State has no
walk-away opportunity, however costly or difficult, the States are victims of
impermissible federal coercion"); cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of
legislation under the "traditional governmental functions test" on the grounds that it
did not compel the states to do anything at all because they had a choice to not do
what the federal government requested).
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administer a federal regulatory program because the states can choose
not to sell and disseminate drivers' personal information.)"- By failing
to recognize the crucial role choice plays in determining whether
legislation violates the substantive Tenth Amendment restrictions
enunciated in New York and Printz, the Reno Court missed an
opportunity to reconcile these cases with the Court's Spending Clause
jurisprudence.324 Also, the Court should have noted that states are not
given a true choice if they must either enact or administer a federal
regulatory program or not engage in sovereign activities because this
would cross the line between inducement and impermissible
coercion.32
General applicability is merely an indicator of constitutionality
under the Tenth Amendment, because not every statute targeting the
states as states impermissibly coerces the states by forcing them to
engage in "uniquely sovereign activities." Generally applicable
legislation, for example the legislation challenged in Garcia and
Baker, does not impermissibly coerce the states because of the nature
of the underlying activity being regulated.3 2 Legislation that is not
generally applicable, however, may impermissibly force the states to
engage in the most basic of sovereign activities, such as legislating and
enforcing laws against third parties. Such a result can never occur
when the law is generally applicable, but will also not necessarily
occur when the law is directed at the states as states, depending on the
nature of the activity being regulated. 27
The Supreme Court's opinion in Reno missed an opportunity to
embrace this conceptualization of past precedent. The Court failed to
hold that the principles of federalism enunciated in Garcia prevent
Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, from forcing the
states as states to engage in "uniquely sovereign activities."
Otherwise, such commandeering would lead to diminished political
323. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161
F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) ("If states do not wish to comply with those
regulations, they may stop disseminating information in their motor vehicle records to
the public."), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000); see also Hartzell-Jordan, supra note 8,
at 248-50 (noting that the DPPA and the legislation challenged in Baker is
distinguishable from the legislation invalidated in New York and Printz because the
states had a choice in the former case to avoid complying with the regulations);
Recent Cases, supra note 56, at 1102 (stating that the "anti-commandeering standard
is inextricably linked to a state's ability to decline the imposed regulation").
324. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987), see also Oklahoma v.
Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581, 587 (D.D.C. 1979) ("The Tenth Amendment has been
consistently construed so as to support the grant and use of federal funds conditioned
upon a state's compliance with federal requirements, as long as the state may also
choose not to comply.").
325. Cf. New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (holding that by giving the state two
unconstitutional choices, Congress crosses "the line distinguishing encouragement
from coercion").
326. See supra notes 120-57 and accompanying text.
327. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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accountability, which is a defect in the national political process.2 8
Examples of this impermissible type of legislation include statutes that
force the state legislature to enact laws,329 force state executive
officials to enforce regulations,30 and determine the qualifications of
high-level state governmental officials such as judges.33'
The Reno Court correctly reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision
because the DPPA does not violate the substantive Tenth
Amendment restrictions imposed on Congress's exercise of its
Commerce Clause powers. The Court, however, should have clarified
its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence by holding that New York and
Printz are not a distinct line of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence;
rather, they are cases following the Garcia line that impose
substantive Tenth Amendment limitations in order to prevent a defect
in the national political process-diminished political accountability."2
The Court should have further clarified that the substantive Tenth
Amendment protections under Garcia are triggered when federal
legislation diminishes political accountability by forcing the States to
engage in "uniquely sovereign activities. 333
The DPPA directly regulates a commercial activity that the states as
states engage in: the sale and dissemination of personal information.1 4
The Court should have upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA
based on this fact alone, because the underlying activity being
regulated is commercial, not uniquely sovereign.335 Furthermore, the
DPPA does not force the states to administer a federal regulatory
program because states have the choice of avoiding federal regulation
by choosing not to engage in the commercial sale and dissemination of
drivers' personal information.336  Because state officials chose to
continue engaging in this activity with the knowledge that federal
regulations attach, political accountability is not diminished even if
citizens think that the state passed the law. This is so because state
officials make an informed choice to engage in the regulated activity
328. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
329. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
330. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997).
331. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1991). Although the Gregory
Court did not hold that the principles of federalism invalidated Congressional
Commerce Clause legislation that determined the qualifications of high-ranking
government officials, the Court intimated that it would do so. See supra note 180.
Because of situations such as these, where Congress could force states to engage in
uniquely sovereign activities that do not involve regulating citizens, the market
participant versus citizen regulator distinction apparently adopted by the Seventh
Circuit is too narrow to protect states because it would not prohibit all federal laws
that force states to engage in uniquely sovereign activities. See Travis v. Reno, 163
F.3d 1000, 1003-05 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 931 (2000).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 313-15.
333. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
334. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
335. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 319-25 and accompanying text.
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that may result in the state being blamed for a federal program, and
therefore, they make a calculated decision to risk such confusion. For
these reasons, the Reno Court should have held that the DPPA does
not violate the principles of federalism enunciated in Garcia because
it does not force the states to engage in any activity, let alone
"uniquely sovereign activities," and therefore does not cause an
extraordinary defect in the national political process by diminishing
political accountability.
CONCLUSION
In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court held that the enactment of
the DPPA was an exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers
that did not violate the Tenth Amendment. The unanimous Court
correctly recognized that the DPPA does not violate the principles of
federalism, but did not provide a cogent rationale for the decision.
The Court should have recognized the importance of the nature of the
underlying state activity being regulated, noted the crucial role of
state choice, and clarified the relationship between Garcia, Baker,
New York, Printz, and Reno. The Court, however, avoided having to
reconcile these recent Supreme Court cases by stretching the
definition of general applicability to encompass the DPPA. By doing
so, the Court missed an opportunity to stabilize its Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
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